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Abstract
In this paper, we study the problem of obtaining 1-of-2 string oblivious transfer (OT) between users Alice and
Bob, in the presence of a passive eavesdropper Eve. The resource enabling OT in our setup is a noisy broadcast
channel from Alice to Bob and Eve. Apart from the OT requirements between the users, Eve is not allowed to learn
anything about the users’ inputs. When Alice and Bob are honest-but-curious and the noisy broadcast channel is made
up of two independent binary erasure channels (connecting Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve), we derive the 1-of-2 string OT
capacity for both 2-privacy (when Eve can collude with either Alice or Bob) and 1-privacy (when no such collusion
is allowed). We generalize these capacity results to 1-of-N string OT and study other variants of this problem. When
Alice and/or Bob are malicious, we present a different scheme based on interactive hashing. This scheme is shown
to be optimal for certain parameter regimes. We present a new formulation of multiple, simultaneous OTs between
Alice-Bob and Alice-Cathy. For this new setup, we present schemes and outer bounds that match in all but one
regime of parameters. Finally, we consider the setup where the broadcast channel is made up of a cascade of two
independent binary erasure channels (connecting Alice-Bob and Bob-Eve) and 1-of-2 string OT is desired between
Alice and Bob with 1-privacy. For this setup, we derive an upper and lower bound on the 1-of-2 string OT capacity
which match in one of two possible parameter regimes.
Index Terms
Oblivious transfer, honest-but-curious, malicious, 2-privacy, 1-privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
In secure multiparty computation (MPC), mutually distrusting users wish to communicate with each other in such
a way that, at the end of the communication, each user can compute a function of the distributed private inputs
The work of M. Mishra and B. K. Dey is supported in part by the Bharti Centre for Communication, IIT Bombay, a grant from the Department
of Science and Technology, Government of India and by the Information Technology Research Academy (ITRA), Government of India under
ITRA-Mobile grant ITRA/15(64)/Mobile/USEAADWN/01. V. M. Prabhakaran’s work was supported in part by a Ramanujan Fellowship from
the Department of Science and Technology, Government of India and by the Information Technology Research Academy (ITRA), Government
of India under ITRA-Mobile grant ITRA/15(64)/Mobile/USEAADWN/01. The work of S. Diggavi was supported in part by NSF grant 1321120.
This work was presented in part at the 2014 and 2015 IEEE International Symposia on Information Theory and at the IEEE Information Theory
Workshop, Hobart, 2014
M. Mishra and B. K. Dey are with the Department of Electrical Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay (IIT Bombay),
Mumbai, India(email: mmishra,bikash@ee.iitb.ac.in). V. M. Prabhakaran is with the School of Technology and Computer Science, Tata Institute
of Fundamental Research (TIFR), Mumbai, India(email: vinodmp@tifr.res.in).S. Diggavi is with the Department of Electrical Engineering,
University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), Los Angeles, USA(email: suhasdiggavi@ucla.edu).
September 8, 2018 DRAFT
2without learning any more than what the function output and the private input reveal about other users’ inputs and
outputs. Applications such as voting, auctions and data-mining, amongst several others [4] illustrate the need for
secure MPC in real life. It is well known that information-theoretically (unconditionally) secure computation between
two users is not possible in general, when the users have only private randomness and noiseless communication as
a resource to enable the computation. A combinatorial characterization of functions that can be securely computed
was derived in [6]. However, additional stochastic resources, such as a noisy channel [7] or distributed sources, can
be used to enable two users to compute a function unconditionally securely.
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a secure two-user computation which has been shown to be a primitive for all two-user
secure computation [8], [9]. That is, if the two users can obtain OT using the resources available to them, then
they can securely compute any function of their inputs. In particular, OT can be achieved if the two users have
access to a noisy channel. A 1-of-2 string OT is a two-party computation where user Alice’s private inputs are
two equal-length strings and user Bob’s private input is a choice bit. Bob obtains exactly one string of his choice
from Alice’s strings, without Alice finding out the identity of the string chosen by Bob. If a discrete memoryless
channel (DMC) is used as a resource to enable such OT, then the OT capacity of the DMC is the largest rate, i.e.
string-length per channel use, that can be obliviously transferred to Bob. Nascimento and Winter [11] characterized
source distributions and channels from which non-zero 1-of-2 string OT rates can be obtained. When Alice and
Bob are honest-but-curious, Ahlswede and Csisza´r [2] derived upper bounds on the 1-of-2 string OT capacity both
for DMCs and distributed sources. Users are honest-but-curious if they do not deviate from the given protocol but,
from whatever they learn during the protocol, they will infer all they can about forbidden information. In contrast,
malicious users may deviate arbitrarily from the given protocol. When the DMC is a binary erasure channel (BEC)
and users are honest-but-curious, Ahlswede and Csisza´r [2] presented a protocol which they showed was capacity
achieving, establishing that min{ǫ, 1 − ǫ} is the 1-of-2 string OT capacity of a BEC(ǫ), where ǫ is the erasure
probability of the channel. They extended these results for a generalized erasure channel (GEC). A GEC is a
channel pY |X , with input alphabet X and output alphabet Y , where Y can be partitioned as Ye ∪ Ye such that
pY |X(y|x) does not depend on the input x ∈ X whenever y ∈ Ye. Specifically, Ahlswede and Csisza´r [2] derived
lower bounds on 1-of-2 string OT capacity for a GEC and showed that the bounds are tight when the erasure
probability of the GEC is at least 1/2. In a surprising result, Pinto et al. [12] proved that using a GEC with erasure
probability at least 1/2, any 1-of-2 string OT rate achieved when Alice and Bob are honest-but-curious can also
be achieved even if Alice and Bob behave maliciously. This result characterized the 1-of-2 string OT capacity of a
GEC, with erasure probability is atleast 1/2, for malicious users. The achievable scheme presented by Pinto et al.
[12] for establishing this result is a generalization of the scheme presented by Savvides [10], that uses a BEC(1/2)
and uses the cryptographic primitive of interactive hashing (see Appendix B for the properties and a protocol for
interactive hashing) to establish checks that detect malicious behavior. More recently, Dowsley and Nascimento
proved [13] that even when the GEC’s erasure probability is less than 1/2, the rate that was shown to be achievable
in [2] for honest-but-curious Alice and Bob is also achievable when Alice and Bob are malicious. To the best of
our knowledge, characterizing the 1-of-2 string OT capacity for other natural channels such as a binary symmetric
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3channel (BSC) remains open in the two-party setting, even with honest-but-curious users.
In this paper we study a natural extension of the OT setup when there is an eavesdropper Eve, who may wiretap
the noisy channel between Alice and Bob. In this case, Eve, who receives partial information about the transmissions,
can use it to deduce the private data or outputs of Alice and Bob. The noisy wiretapped channel we consider is a
binary erasure broadcast channel whose inputs come from Alice and whose outputs are available to Bob and Eve.
For the most part, we consider a binary erasure broadcast channel which provides independent erasure patterns to
Bob and Eve. We also consider the physically degraded binary erasure broadcast channel. In our 3-party setups, we
define two privacy regimes. Privacy against individual parties is referred to as 1-privacy, whereas privacy against
any set of 2 colluding parties is referred to as 2-privacy.
A. Contributions and organization of the paper
• When the noisy broadcast channel is made up of two independent BECs (see Figure 2) and the users are honest-
but-curious, we characterize the 1-of-2 string OT capacity both for 2-privacy and 1-privacy (Theorem 1). We
extend these capacity results to 1-of-N string OT (Theorem 2). Our protocols are natural extensions of the
two-party protocols of Ahlswede and Csisza´r [2] where we use secret keys between Alice and Bob, secret
from Eve, to provide rate-optimal schemes for both privacy regimes. Our converse arguments generalize the
converse of Ahlswede and Csisza´r [2].
• We consider the setup of Figure 2, where Alice and Bob may act maliciously during the OT protocol. We derive
an expression for an achievable rate under 2-privacy constraints (Theorem 3) for this setup. The achievable rate
is optimal when ǫ1 ≤ 1/2 and is no more than a factor of ǫ1 away from the optimal rate when ǫ1 > 1/2. In a
departure from previous protocols [12], [13] which used interactive hashing primarily to detect the malicious
behavior of a user, our protocol uses interactive hashing to generate the secret keys used by Alice and Bob,
secret from Eve, to achieve 2-privacy even with malicious users (for ǫ1 > 1/2). Using interactive hashing only
for checks to detect malicious behavior will not work when ǫ1 > 1/2, since it is possible for Bob, in collusion
with Eve, to pass any such check for uncountably many values of ǫ1, ǫ2.
• In a generalization of the setup of Figure 2, we consider the setup of Figure 4, where instead of the eavesdropper,
we have a legitimate user Cathy. All users are honest-but-curious. Independent 1-of-2 string OTs are required
between Alice-Bob and Alice-Cathy, with 2-privacy. We derive inner and outer bounds on the rate-region
(Theorem 4) for this setup. These bounds match except when ǫ1, ǫ2 > 1/2.
• When the channel is a physically degraded broadcast channel made up of a cascade of two independent BECs
(see Figure 6), a BEC(ǫ1) connecting Alice-Bob followed by a BEC(ǫ2) connecting Bob-Eve, we derive upper
and lower bounds on the 1-of-2 string OT capacity under 1-privacy (Theorem 5), for honest-but-curious users.
These bounds match when ǫ1 ≤ (1/3) · ǫ2(1 − ǫ1). Unlike the secret key agreement problem, which has a
simpler optimal scheme when the broadcast channel is degraded, the scheme for OT turns out to be more
complicated than when Bob’s and Eve’s erasure patterns are independent. This happens because Eve knows
more about the legitimate channel’s noise process when the channel is degraded. Hiding Bob’s choice bit from
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4a more informed Eve is the main novelty of this protocol, compared to the independent erasures case.
The main system model we consider is for obtaining OT between honest-but-curious Alice and Bob, in the
presence of an eavesdropper Eve. This model is introduced in Section II-B. We consider several variants of this
model. Section II-C defines a variant of the main model, where OT is required when Alice and Bob may be
malicious. In Section II-D, we generalize the main model by introducing the user Cathy instead of the eavesdropper
and requiring independent OTs between Alice-Bob and Alice-Cathy. Section II-E is a variant of the main model
where a physically degraded broadcast channel is used as the resource for OT, instead of a broadcast channel
providing independent erasure patterns to Bob and Eve considered in all previous models. The problem statement
for each model is followed by a statement of the result we derive for that model. These results are proved in
Sections III, IV, V and VI. In Section VII, we summarize the work presented in this paper. Section VIII contains a
discussion of the open problems related to the present work. The Appendices at the end consist of the supporting
results referenced in the main proofs.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESULTS
A. Notation
We will use the capital letter X to denote a random variable, whose alphabet will be specified in the context
where X is used. The small letter x will denote a specific realization of X . The bold, small letter x will denote a
k-tuple, where k will be clear from the context in which x is used. The small, indexed letter xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , k
will denote the ith element of x. The bold, capital X will denote a random k-tuple. Furthermore,
• xi := (x1, x2, . . . , xi)
• Suppose a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}m. Then,
– x|a := (xai : i = 1, 2, . . . ,m).
• {x} := {xi : i = 1, 2, . . . , k}.
• Let A ⊂ N. Then, (A) is the tuple formed by arranging the elements of A in increasing order. That is,
– (A) := (ai ∈ A, i = 1, 2, . . . , |A| : ∀i > 1, ai−1 < ai)
For example, if A = {1, 7, 3, 9, 5}, then (A) = (1, 3, 5, 7, 9).
• Let A ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , k}. Then,
– x|A := x|(A)
For example, if x = (a, b, c, d, e, f, g) and A = {7, 2, 5}, then x|A = (b, e, g).
• Suppose y ∈ {0, 1,⊥}k, where ⊥ represents an erasure. Then,
– #e(y) := |{i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} : yi = ⊥}|.
– #e(y) := |{i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} : yi 6= ⊥}|.
For a ∈ R, b ∈ R+, we define:
• < a >:= |a| − ⌊|a|⌋
• Nb(a) := {α ∈ R : |a− α| ≤ b}
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5B. Oblivious Transfer over a Wiretapped Channel: Honest-but-Curious Model
Alice Bob
Eve
pY Z|X
K0,K1 U
KˆU
X Y
Z
Public channel (noiseless)
Fig. 1: 1-of-2 string OT in presence of an eavesdropper
The setup of Figure 1 has two users Alice and Bob and an eavesdropper Eve. Alice and Bob are honest-but-
curious. Alice’s private data consists of two m-bit strings K0,K1. Bob’s private data is his choice bit U . The
random variablesK0,K1, U are independent and chosen uniformly at random over their respective alphabets. Alice
can communicate with Bob and Eve over a broadcast channel pY Z|X , with the output Y available to Bob and the
output Z available to Eve. Additionally, Alice and Bob can send messages over a noiseless public channel, with
each such message becoming available to Eve as well.
Definition 1 Let m,n ∈ N. An (m,n)-protocol is an exchange of messages between Alice and Bob in the setup of
Figure 1. Alice’s private strings K0,K1 are m-bits each. Alice transmits a bit Xt over the channel at each time
instant t = 1, 2, . . . , n. Also, before each channel transmission and after the last channel transmission, Alice and
Bob take turns to send messages (arbitrarily many but finite number) over the public channel. Any transmission by
a user is a function of the user’s input, private randomness and all the public messages, channel inputs or channel
outputs the user has seen. The rate of the protocol is rn := m/n. Let Λ denote the transcript of the public channel
at the end of an (m,n)-protocol.
Let the final views of Alice, Bob and Eve be, respectively, VA, VB and VE , where the final view of a user is the
set of all random variables received and generated by that user over the duration of the protocol. For the present
setup:
VA := {K0,K1,X,Λ} (1)
VB := {U,Y ,Λ} (2)
VE := {Z,Λ} (3)
where X := (X1, X2, . . . , Xn), Y := (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn) and Z := (Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn). Bob computes the estimate
KˆU (of the string KU ) as a function of its final view VB .
Definition 2 R2P is an achievable 2-private rate for honest-but-curious users if there exists a sequence of (m,n)-
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6protocols such that m/n −→ R2P as n −→∞ and
P [KˆU 6=KU ] −→ 0 (4)
I(KU ;VB , VE) −→ 0 (5)
I(U ;VA, VE) −→ 0 (6)
I(K0,K1, U ;VE) −→ 0 (7)
as n −→ ∞, where U = U ⊕ 1 and ⊕ is the sum modulo-2.
Definition 3 R1P is an achievable 1-private rate for honest-but-curious users if there exists a sequence of (m,n)-
protocols such that m/n −→ R1P as n −→∞ and
P [KˆU 6=KU ] −→ 0 (8)
I(KU ;VB) −→ 0 (9)
I(U ;VA) −→ 0 (10)
I(K0,K1, U ;VE) −→ 0 (11)
The 2-private capacity C2P is the supremum of all achievable 2-private rates for honest-but-curious users and
the 1-private capacity C1P is the supremum of all achievable 1-private rates for honest-but-curious users.
The main result in this section is a characterization of C2P and C1P for the setup of Figure 2. The setup of
Figure 2 is a specific case of the setup of Figure 1, where the broadcast channel is made up of two independent
binary erasure channels (BECs), namely, BEC(ǫ1) which is a BEC with erasure probability ǫ1 connecting Alice to
Bob and BEC(ǫ2) connecting Alice to Eve.
Alice Bob
Eve
BEC(ǫ1)
BEC(ǫ2)
X Y
Z
K0,K1 U
KˆU
Public channel (noiseless)
Fig. 2: 1-of-2 string OT using a binary erasure broadcast channel
Theorem 1 (OT capacity for erasure broadcast channel) The 1-of-2 string OT capacity, with 2-privacy, for honest-
but-curious users in the setup of Figure 2 is
C2P = ǫ2 ·min{ǫ1, 1− ǫ1}.
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7The 1-of-2 string OT capacity, with 1-privacy, for honest-but-curious users in the setup of Figure 2 is
C1P =


ǫ1, ǫ1 <
ǫ2
2
ǫ2
2 ,
ǫ2
2 ≤ ǫ1 <
1
2
ǫ2(1− ǫ1),
1
2 ≤ ǫ1
This result is proved in Section III.
The above results extend easily to the setup of 1-of-N (N ≥ 2) string OT, with honest-but-curious users, in the
presence of an eavesdropper (see Figure 3). The difference with the setup of Figure 2 is that Alice now has N
private strings K0,K1, . . . ,KN−1 and Bob’s choice variable U can take values in {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. Definition 1
still defines a protocol and it is straightforward to extend Definition 2 and Definition 3 to define the achievable
rates, for the setup of Figure 3. The following theorem characterizes C2P and C1P for this setup:
Theorem 2 (1-of-N OT capacity for erasure broadcast channel) The 1-of-N string OT capacity, with 2-privacy
and with 1-privacy, for honest-but-curious users in the setup of Figure 3 is, respectively,
CN2P = ǫ2 ·min
{
ǫ1
N − 1
, 1− ǫ1
}
CN1P =


ǫ1
N−1 ,
ǫ1
N−1 <
ǫ2
N
ǫ2
N ,
ǫ2
N ≤
ǫ1
N−1 <
1
N
ǫ2(1 − ǫ1),
1
N ≤
ǫ1
N−1
Alice Bob
Eve
BEC(ǫ1)
BEC(ǫ2)
X Y
Z
K0,K1, . . . ,KN−1 U
KˆU
Public channel (noiseless)
Fig. 3: 1-of-N string OT using a binary erasure broadcast channel
Theorems 1 and 2 show that the presence of an eavesdropper reduces the OT capacity by a factor of ǫ2 for
2-privacy, compared to the results of Ahlswede and Csisza´r [2]. Intuitively, this means that Alice and Bob can get
OT with 2-privacy only over the segment of Alice’s transmissions that were erased for Eve. Also, note that for
ǫ1 ≥ 1/2, C1P = C2P while for ǫ1 < 1/2, C1P > C2P . By putting ǫ2 = 1, as one would expect, these capacity
results reduce to the 2-party OT capacity results of Ahlswede and Csisza´r [2].
C. Oblivious Transfer over a Wiretapped Channel: Malicious Model
The setup is the same as that shown in Figure 2. The main difference with the problem definition of Section II-B
is that Alice an Bob can be malicious. That is, they can deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. We consider only
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82-privacy in this setup1. Definition 1 defines a protocol and the rate of the protocol for this setup.
Definition 4 R is an achievable 2-private rate for malicious users if there exists a sequence of (m,n)-protocols
such that m/n −→ R and:
1) If Alice and Bob are both honest, then the protocol aborts with vanishing probability and (4)-(7) are satisfied,
as n −→∞.
2) If Alice is malicious and colludes with Eve and Bob is honest, let Vn be the view of a malicious Alice colluding
with Eve at the end of the protocol. Then, I(U ;Vn) −→ 0 as n −→∞.
3) If Alice is honest and Bob is malicious and colludes with Eve, let Vn be the view of a malicious Bob colluding
with Eve at the end of the protocol. Then, min{I(K0;Vn), I(K1;Vn)} −→ 0 as n −→∞.
Theorem 3 (An achievable OT rate with malicious users) Any R <


C2P , ǫ1 ≤
1
2
ǫ1 · C2P , ǫ1 >
1
2

, where C2P =
ǫ2 ·min{ǫ1, 1− ǫ1}, is an achievable 2-private 1-of-2 string OT rate for malicious users in the setup of Figure 2.
This result is proved in Section IV. Note that C2P is the 2-private OT capacity when users are honest-but-curious
in this setup. Hence, the result shows that the achievable scheme we present is rate-optimal when ǫ1 ≤ 1/2 and no
more than a fraction ǫ1 away from the optimal rate otherwise. The compromise in rate when ǫ1 > 1/2 happens for
the following reason. Our protocol (for the regime where ǫ1 > 1/2) uses interactive hashing to obtain two subsets
of Alice’s transmissions over the broadcast channel. Alice converts the non-overlapping parts of these subsets into
two secret keys using standard techniques.2 Losing the overlapping part of both the subsets in this process gives
us shorter secret keys, which in turn results in the rate loss by a factor of ǫ1.
D. Independent Oblivious Transfers over a broadcast channel
Alice Bob
Cathy
BEC(ǫ1)
BEC(ǫ2)
X Y
Z
K0,K1
J0,J1
U
W
KˆU
JˆW
Public channel (noiseless)
Fig. 4: Independent OTs using a binary erasure broadcast channel
1A protocol for achieving 1-privacy in this setup is obtained by only a minor modification (greater privacy amplification) to the two-party
protocols presented in [12], [13] and is, therefore, being omitted from this work.
2Alice will use these keys to encrypt her strings. For obtaining 2-privacy, our protocol ensures that one of the keys is secret from Bob and
both the keys are secret from Eve.
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9In the setup of Figure 4, we have three users Alice, Bob and Cathy. Alice is connected to Bob and Cathy by a
broadcast channel made up of two independent BECs, a BEC(ǫ1) connecting Alice to Bob and a BEC(ǫ2) connecting
Alice to Cathy. In addition, there is a noiseless public channel of unlimited capacity over which the three users can
take turns to send messages. Each such public message is received by all the users. Alice’s private data consists of
two pairs of strings K0,K1 and J0,J1. Bob’s and Cathy’s private data are the choice bits U and W respectively.
K0,K1,J0,J1, U,W are independent and uniform over their respective alphabets. The goal is for Bob to obtain
KU with 2-privacy and for Cathy to obtain JW with 2-privacy3
Definition 5 Let n,mB,mC ∈ N. An (n,mB,mC)-protocol is an exchange of messages between Alice, Bob and
Cathy over the setup of Figure 4. Alice’s private data consists of strings K0,K1 which are mB-bits each and
strings J0,J1 which are mC -bits each. Alice transmits a bit Xt over the broadcast channel at each time instant
t = 1, 2, . . . , n. In addition, before each such transmission and after the last transmission (t = n), the users take
turns to send messages on the noiseless public channel over several rounds. The number of rounds maybe random,
but finite with probability one. Any transmission by a user is a function of the user’s input, private randomness
and all the public messages, channel inputs or channel outputs the user has seen. The rate-pair (rB,n, rC,n) of an
(n,mB,mC)-protocol is given by rB,n := mB/n and rC,n := mC/n. Let Λ denote the transcript of the public
channel at the end of an (n,mB ,mC)-protocol.
The final view of a user is the collection of all random variables available to the user at the end of the execution
of the (n,mB,mC)-protocol. We denote these for Alice, Bob, and Cathy by VA, VB , and VC , respectively. At
the end of an (n,mB,mC)-protocol, Bob generates an estimate KˆU of KU as a function of its final view VB .
Similarly, Cathy generates an estimate JˆW of JW as a function of its final view VC .
Definition 6 (RB, RC) ∈ R2 is an achievable 2-private rate-pair for honest-but-curious users in the setup of Figure 4
if there exists a sequence of (n,mB,mC)-protocols with (rB,n, rC,n) −→ (RB , RC) as n −→∞, such that
P [KˆU 6=KU ] −→ 0 (12)
P [JˆW 6= JW ] −→ 0 (13)
I(KU ,JW ;VB, VC) −→ 0 (14)
I(U ;VA, VC) −→ 0 (15)
I(W ;VA, VB) −→ 0 (16)
I(U,W ;VA) −→ 0 (17)
I(K0,K1, U,JW ;VC) −→ 0 (18)
3 The BGW algorithm [5] gives a mechanism to achieve 1-private computations in any 3-user setting when each user is allowed to use private
randomness and there are private links between each pair of users. But achieving a 2-private computation in a 3-user setting is, in general, not
feasible even with honest-but-curious users.
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I(KU ,J0,J1,W ;VB) −→ 0 (19)
as n −→ ∞.
Definition 7 The 2-private rate-region R ⊂ R2 for the setup of Figure 4 is the closure of the set of all achievable
2-private rate pairs for honest-but-curious users.
The main results in this section are inner and outer bounds for the 2-private rate region R, for the setup of
Figure 4, when the users are honest-but-curious4.
Theorem 4 (OT rate-region for erasure broadcast channel) The rate-region R of independent pairs of 1-of-2
string OTs, with 2-privacy, for honest-but-curious users in the setup of Figure 4 is such that
Rinner ⊆ R ⊆ Router
where
Rinner =
{
(RB , RC) ∈ R
2
+ : RB ≤ ǫ2min{ǫ1, 1− ǫ1},
RC ≤ ǫ1min{ǫ2, 1− ǫ2},
RB +RC ≤ ǫ2 ·min{ǫ1, 1− ǫ1}+ ǫ1 ·min{ǫ2, 1− ǫ2}
−min{ǫ1, 1− ǫ1} ·min{ǫ2, 1− ǫ2}
}
and
Router =
{
(RB, RC) ∈ R
2
+ : RB ≤ ǫ2 ·min{ǫ1, 1− ǫ1},
RC ≤ ǫ1 ·min{ǫ2, 1− ǫ2},
RB +RC ≤ ǫ1 · ǫ2
}
.
Theorem 4 is proved in Section V. The regions R,Rinner,Router are illustrated for different regimes of ǫ1, ǫ2 in
Figure 5(a), Figure 5(b) and Figure 5(c). The inner and outer bounds match except when ǫ1, ǫ2 > 1/2. The upper
bounds on RB and RC in the expressions above are the 2-private OT capacities for Bob and Cathy, respectively,
obtained as a consequence of Theorem 1. The upper bound on the sum-rate is the fraction of Alice’s transmissions
that are erased for both Bob and Cathy.
E. Oblivious Transfer Over a Degraded Wiretapped Channel
In the setup of Figure 6, Alice is connected to Bob and Eve by a broadcast channel made up of a cascade of two
independent BECs, a BEC(ǫ1) followed by a BEC(ǫ2). Alice and Bob are honest-but-curious. A 1-of-2 string OT is
4See Section VIII for a discussion on considering malicious users in this setup.
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RB
RC
•
•
ǫ1 · ǫ2
ǫ1 · ǫ2
(a) Rate region R when ǫ1, ǫ2 ≤ 1/2
RB
RC
• •
•
ǫ1 · (1 − ǫ2)
ǫ1 · (2ǫ2 − 1)
ǫ1 · ǫ2
(b) Rate region R when ǫ1 ≤ 1/2 < ǫ2
RB
RC
• •
•
•
ǫ1 · (1 − ǫ2)
(1 − ǫ2) · (2ǫ1 − 1)
(1 − ǫ1) · (2ǫ2 − 1) ǫ2 · (1 − ǫ1)
Router
Rinner
(c) Regions Rinner and Router when 1/2 < ǫ1, ǫ2
Fig. 5: R, Rinner, Router for all regimes of ǫ1, ǫ2
Alice
Bob Eve
BEC(ǫ1) BEC(ǫ2)
Public channel (noiseless)
K0,K1
U
KˆU
X Y Z
Fig. 6: 1-of-2 string OT over a degraded binary erasure broadcast channel
desired between Alice and Bob, with 1-privacy5. Definition 1 and Definition 3 define a protocol and an achievable
rate, respectively, for this setup.
Theorem 5 (OT capacity bounds for degraded erasure broadcast channel) The 1-of-2 string OT capacity with
1-privacy, C1P , for honest-but-curious users in the setup of Figure 6, is such that
min
{
1
3
ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1
}
≤ C1P ≤ min{ǫ2(1 − ǫ1), ǫ1}.
This result is proved in Section VI. The upper and lower bounds in this result match when ǫ1 ≤ 13 ǫ2(1 − ǫ1).
Unlike the previous setups where Bob and Eve/Cathy receive independent erasure patterns, Eve here has more
knowledge of the noise process in the channel connecting Alice and Bob. Specifically, Eve knows that Bob’s
erasure pattern is a subset of the erasure pattern she observes. This makes it harder to guarantee privacy for Bob
against Eve.
5We suspect that no positive 2-private OT rate can be achieved in this setup, though our brief attempt to prove this has not been successful.
The problem of obtaining OT when users can behave maliciously in this setup appears to require newer techniques and has been deferred to a
future study.
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III. OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER OVER A WIRETAPPED CHANNEL IN THE HONEST-BUT-CURIOUS MODEL : PROOF OF
THEOREM 1
A. 2-privacy : Achievability
For the achievability part of our proof, we describe a protocol (Protocol 1) which is a natural extension of the
two-party protocol of Ahlswede and Csisza´r [2] for achieving OT between Alice and Bob using a BEC(ǫ1). Our
extension is designed to achieve OT in the presence of Eve (see Figure 2), with 2-privacy. For a sequence of
Protocol 1 instances of rate r < C2P , we show that (4)-(7) hold. This establishes that any r < C2P is an achievable
2-private rate in the setup of Figure 2. We begin by introducing the two-party OT protocol of Ahlswede and Csisza´r
[2].
BEC(ǫ1)Alice Bob
K0,K1 U
noiseless channel
X Y
KˆU
Fig. 7: Setup for two-party OT using a BEC(ǫ1)
1) Two-party OT protocol [2]: Consider the two-party setup of Figure 7. The OT capacity in this setup is
min{ǫ1, 1− ǫ1} [2]. Let r < min{ǫ1, 1− ǫ1}. Ahlswede and Csisza´r’s [2] protocol begins with Alice transmitting
a sequence X of n i.i.d., Bernoulli(1/2) bits over the channel. Bob receives the channel output Y . Let E be the
set of all indices at which Y is erased and E that of all indices at which Y is unerased. If |E| < nr or |E| < nr,
Bob aborts the protocol since he does not have sufficient erasures or non-erasures to run the protocol. From E, Bob
picks a subset LU of cardinality nr, uniformly at random. From E, Bob picks a subset LU of the same cardinality
as LU , also uniformly at random and then sends the sets L0, L1 over the public channel. Alice cannot infer which
of the sets L0, L1 consists of indices at which Y was erased, since the channel acts independently on each input
bit. As a result, Alice does not learn U when it receives L0, L1 from Bob. Alice uses X|L0 ,X|L1 as the keys to
encrypt its strings and send these encrypted strings to Bob. That is, Alice sends K0 ⊕X|L0 ,K1 ⊕X |L1 to Bob
over the public channel. Bob knows only the key X |LU (since Y |LU is unerased) and knows nothing about the
key X|LU (since Y |LU is erased). As a result, Bob learns KU but learns nothing about KU .
2) Protocol for 2-privacy in the wiretapped model: The above two-party protocol, as is, is insufficient for privacy
against Eve in our wiretapped channel model (see Figure 2). This is because the keys X|L0 ,X|L1 that Alice uses in
the two-party protocol are both partially known to Eve, since Eve knows an independently erased version Z of X .
As a result, when Alice sends K0 ⊕X|L0 ,K1 ⊕X|L1 to Bob over the public channel, Eve learns approximately
a fraction (1− ǫ2) of both of Alice’s strings, violating (7).
The key idea in our protocol (Protocol 1) is that Alice converts the strings X |L0 ,X|L1 into independent secret
keys S0,S1 respectively. Only one of these keys will be known to Bob and none of these keys will be known to
Eve. Alice now sends K0 ⊕ S0,K1 ⊕ S1 to Bob over the public channel. In order to have S0 and S1 of length
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about nr bits each, our protocol requires |L0| = |L1| = nr/ǫ2 approximately. Clearly, Bob knows SU since he
knows X|LU and can, thus, recover KU from Alice’s public message. As we prove later, SU remains unknown
to a colluding Bob and Eve and so these colluding parties do not learn KU , a key requirement for 2-privacy.
Since S0,S1 were independent and secret from Eve, clearly, Eve does not learn anything about Alice’s strings
from K0 ⊕S0,K1 ⊕S1. In order to convert X|L0 ,X|L1 into independent secret keys S0,S1 respectively, Alice
selects two functions F0, F1 randomly and independently from a class F of universal2 hash functions [14], [15] (see
Appendix A for details). The inputs of F0, F1 are about nr/ǫ2 bits long and their outputs are about nr bits long.
The required keys are S0 = F0(X |L0) and S1 = F1(X|L1). The main property of universal2 hash functions used
here is privacy amplification [3, Corollary 4]. In the present case, privacy amplification by the chosen universal2
hash functions guarantees that the function output appears nearly random to any eavesdropper (e.g. colluding Bob
and Eve) who does not know approximately a fraction ǫ2 (or more) of the function input. Alice sends F0, F1 to
Bob alongwith K0 ⊕ S0,K1 ⊕ S1 over the public channel.
Protocol 1 Protocol for achieving any r < C2P
Parameters : • δ ∈ (0, 1) such that r < (ǫ2 − δ)(min{ǫ1, 1− ǫ1} − δ) and (ǫ2 − δ) ∈ Q
• 0 < δ˜ < r, δ˜ ∈ Q
• β = rǫ2−δ
• βn, n(r − δ˜) ∈ N
• The rate6of the protocol is (r − δ˜)
1: Alice transmits an n-tuple X of i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2)
bits over the channel.
2: Bob receives the n-tuple Y from BEC(ǫ1). Bob
forms the sets
E := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Yi 6= ⊥}
E := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Yi = ⊥}
If |E| < βn or |E| < βn, Bob aborts the protocol.
3: Bob creates the following sets:
LU ∼ Unif{A ⊂ E : |A| = βn}
LU ∼ Unif{A ⊂ E : |A| = βn}
Bob reveals L0, L1 to Alice over the public channel.
4: Alice randomly and independently chooses functions
F0, F1 from a family F of universal2 hash functions:
F0, F1 : {0, 1}
βn −→ {0, 1}n(r−δ˜)
Alice finally sends the following information to Bob
on the public channel:
F0, F1, K0 ⊕ F0(X |L0), K1 ⊕ F1(X|L1)
5: Bob knows FU ,X|LU and can, therefore, recover
KU .
Lemma 1 Any r < C2P is an achievable 2-private rate in the setup of Figure 2 when users are honest-but-curious.
6The parameters δ, δ˜ can be chosen to be arbitrarily small so that this rate takes any desired value less than C2P .
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A formal proof of this lemma is deferred to Appendix C-B. A sketch of this proof is as follows. It suffices
to prove this lemma only for rational values of r < C2P due to the denseness of Q in R. Let (Pn){n∈N} be
a sequence of Protocol 1 instances, of rate r − δ˜. With high probability, Pn does not abort. In that case, Bob
knows the key SU = FU (X|LU ) and can recover KU from K0 ⊕ S0,K1 ⊕ S1 that Alice sends. As a result,
(4) holds for (Pn){n∈N}. For the key SU = FU (X|LU ), the privacy amplification by FU on its input ensures
that the amount of information that colluding Bob and Eve learn about SU falls exponentially in n. As a result,
colluding Bob and Eve learn only a vanishingly small amount of information about KU and, thus, (5) holds for
(Pn){n∈N}. The only way that colluding Alice and Eve can learn U is when Bob sends L0, L1. But since the
channel acts independently on each input bit, the composition of L0, L1 does not reveal U . Thus, (6) holds for the
protocol sequence. Finally, conditioned on knowing U , Eve still does not learn anything about Alice’s strings. This
is because in the keys S0 = F0(X|L0),S1 = F1(X|L1), the privacy amplification by F0, F1 on their respective
inputs ensures that the amount of information Eve learns about S0,S1 falls exponentially in n. As a result, Eve
gains only a vanishingly small amount of information about K0,K1 from Alice’s public message. This guarantees
that (7) holds for (Pn){n∈N}.
B. 1-privacy : Achievability
Our protocol (Protocol 2) for achieving OT in the presence of Eve, with 1-privacy in our setup (see Figure 2),
is an extension of Ahlswede and Csisza´r’s two-party OT protocol [2]. For a sequence of Protocol 2 instances of
rate r < C1P , we show that (8)-(11) hold. This establishes that any r < C1P is an achievable 1-private rate in the
setup of Figure 2.
For achieving 1-privacy, recall that privacy for Alice’s strings is required only individually against Bob and against
Eve, not against colluding Bob and Eve. As a result, the main change in Protocol 2, compared to Protocol 1, is
that the requirement of LU coming entirely from E is relaxed. Protocol 2 requires that nr indices in LU have
to come from E. The remaining about (nr/ǫ2) − nr indices in LU can come from an arbitrary combination of
leftover indices of E and E. Since the key SU = FU (X|LU ) is about nr bits long, privacy amplification by FU
on its input X|LU ensures that SU is unknown to Bob. Since |LU | is about nr/ǫ2, the privacy amplification also
guarantees that SU is unknown to Eve as well. Thus, the key SU remains hidden individually from Bob and from
Eve and that suffices to achieve 1-privacy in the setup. Furthermore, note that when ǫ1 < 1/2, Protocol 1 had
unused indices from E which Protocol 2 can use in constructing a larger LU . This results in higher achievable
1-private rates compared to achievable 2-private rates when ǫ1 < 1/2.
Lemma 2 Any r < C1P is an achievable 1-private rate in the setup of Figure 2 when users are honest-but-curious.
This lemma is formally proved in Appendix C-C. A sketch of its proof now follows. Let (Pn){n∈N} be a sequence
of Protocol 2 instances, of rate r− δ˜. If the protocol does not abort, then (8), (10) and (11) hold for (Pn){n∈N} for
the same reasons that (4), (6) and (7) respectively hold for a sequence of Protocol 1 instances. To see that (9) holds
for (Pn){n∈N}, note that LU consists of at least nr indices at which Y is erased. Also, the key SU = FU (X|LU )
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Protocol 2 Protocol for achieving any r < C1P
Parameters : • δ ∈ (0, 1) such that r < min{(ǫ1− δ), 12 (ǫ2− δ), (ǫ2− δ)(1− ǫ1− δ)} and (ǫ2− δ) ∈ Q
• 0 < δ˜ < r, δ˜ ∈ Q
• β = rǫ2−δ
• βn, nr, n(r − δ˜) ∈ N
• The rate7of the protocol is (r − δ˜)
1: Alice transmits an n-tuple X of i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2)
bits over the channel.
2: Bob receives the n-tuple Y from BEC(ǫ1). Bob
forms the sets
E := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Yi 6= ⊥}
E := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Yi = ⊥}
If |E| < βn or |E| < nr, Bob aborts the protocol.
3: Bob creates the following sets:
L ∼ Unif{A ⊂ E : |A| = nr}
LU ∼ Unif{A ⊂ E : |A| = βn}
LU ∼ L ∪ Unif{A ⊂ E\LU ∪ E\L : |A| = (β − r)n}
Bob reveals L0, L1 to Alice over the public channel.
4: Alice randomly and independently chooses functions
F0, F1 from a family F of universal2 hash functions:
F0, F1 : {0, 1}
βn −→ {0, 1}n(r−δ˜)
Alice finally sends the following information on the
public channel:
F0, F1, K0 ⊕ F0(X |L0), K1 ⊕ F1(X|L1)
5: Bob knows FU ,X|LU and can, therefore, recover
KU .
is about nr bits long and privacy amplification by FU on its input X|LU ensures that the amount of information
Bob learns about SU falls exponentially with n. Hence, Bob learns only a vanishingly small amount of information
about the string KU from K0 ⊕ S0,K1 ⊕ S1.
C. 2-privacy : Converse
We only require a weaker secrecy condition to prove our converse. Specifically, we only need (5) and (7) to hold
with a 1/n multiplied to their left-hand-sides.
Lemma 3 If r2P is an achievable 2-private rate in the setup of Figure 2 when users are honest-but-curious, then
r2P ≤ C2P .
Proof: We first show a general upper bound on r2P . For the setup in Figure 1,
r2P ≤ min
{
max
pX
I(X ;Y |Z),max
pX
H(X |Y, Z)
}
.
7The parameters δ, δ˜ can be chosen to be arbitrarily small so that this rate takes any desired value less than C1P .
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It is straightforward to verify that any OT protocol for the setup in Figure 1 is a two-party OT protocol between
Alice and Bob-Eve combined. Using an outerbound for OT capacity in [2], we have
r2P ≤ max
pX
H(X |Y, Z).
To see that maxpX I(X ;Y |Z) is an upper bound on r2P , we argue that using an OT protocol, Alice and Bob can
agree on a secret key, secret from Eve, at the same rate as the OT. Suppose we modify the OT protocol so that at
the end of it, Bob reveals U over the public channel. As a result, Alice learns KU . We show that this string KU is
a secret key between Alice and Bob, which Eve knows nothing about. Since Alice learns KU and (4) holds, both
Alice and Bob learn KU . Further, (7) implies that (1/n) · I(K0,K1, U,KU ;VE) −→ 0. This, in turn, implies that
(1/n) · I(KU ;VE |U) −→ 0. Now:
1
n
I(KU ;VE |U) =
1
n
(I(KU ;VE , U)− I(KU ;U))
≥
1
n
I(KU ;VE , U)−
1
n
.
Hence, (1/n) · I(KU ;VE , U) −→ 0 as n −→∞. This shows that in the modified protocol, after Bob reveals U
at the end, Alice and Bob learn KU and Eve learns only a vanishingly small amount of information about KU .
Hence, KU becomes a secret key between Alice and Bob, against Eve. Since maxpX I(X ;Y |Z) is an upperbound
on secret key capacity for the setup of Figure 1 [1], we get:
r2P ≤ max
pX
I(X ;Y |Z).
Evaluating the upper bound for the setup of Figure 2, we get:
r2P ≤ max
pX
I(X ;Y |Z) = ǫ2(1− ǫ1)
r2P ≤ max
pX
H(X |(Y, Z)) = ǫ2ǫ1.
As a result, r2P ≤ C2P .
D. 1-privacy : Converse
As before, we show that the upper bounds hold even under weakened security conditions, where (9) and (11)
hold with a 1/n multiplied to their left-hand-sides.
Lemma 4 If r1P is an achievable 1-private rate, with honest-but-curious users, for the setup of Figure 2, then
r1P ≤ C1P .
Proof:
We first show that r1P ≤ min {ǫ1, ǫ2(1 − ǫ1)} by means of the following more general statement: For the setup
of Figure 1,
r1P ≤
{
max
pX
I(X ;Y |Z),max
pX
H(X |Y )
}
. (20)
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Proof for r1P ≤ maxpX I(X ;Y |Z) is identical to the proof for r2P ≤ maxpX I(X ;Y |Z) (in the proof of
Lemma 3).
r1P ≤ maxpX H(X |Y ) follows from the observation that any OT protocol achieving 1-privacy in the setup
of Figure 1, is also a two-party OT protocol between two users connected by the channel pY |X . As a result,
maxpX H(X |Y ), which is an upper bound on two-party OT rate [2], is also an upper bound on r1P . Evaluated for
the setup of Figure 2, these upperbounds are:
r1P ≤ max
pX
H(X |Y ) = ǫ1
r1P ≤ max
pX
I(X ;Y |Z) = ǫ2(1− ǫ1).
We now prove that r1P ≤ ǫ2/2 for setup of Figure 2, which will complete the proof of the converse. We use the
following lemma (proved in Appendix C-D) which shows that both K0,K1 can be decoded from X,Λ.
Lemma 5
1
n
H(K0,K1|X,Λ) −→ 0 as n −→∞
Intuitively, this lemma holds for the following reason: Alice cannot learn which of its two strings Bob requires
(cf.(10)). Thus, anyone observing the cut separating Alice from the system, i.e. X,Λ, must be able to decode both
K0,K1. If this were not the case and, say, K0 could not be decoded from X ,Λ, then Alice can infer that Bob
wanted K1 which violates (10).
We can convert this lemma into an upperbound as follows: Knowing X,Λ, one can decode K0,K1. Eve has
access to almost all of X,Λ, except about an ǫ2 fraction of X which was erased by the channel. It is required
that Eve learns no information about both K0,K1. As a result, each string’s length cannot exceed nǫ2/2. More
formally, let E˜ := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Zi = ⊥}. Let e˜ denote a realization of E˜ and let e˜ = {1, 2, . . . , n}\e˜ be the
complement of e˜. Then,
2m = H(K0,K1)
= I(K0,K1;X,Λ) +H(K0,K1|X,Λ)
(a)
= I(K0,K1;X,Λ) + o(n)
(b)
= I(K0,K1;X,Λ|E˜) + o(n)
=
∑
e˜⊆{1,2,...,n}
pE˜(e˜)I(K0,K1;X,Λ|E˜ = e˜) + o(n)
=
∑
e˜⊆{1,2,...,n}
pE˜(e˜)I(K0,K1;X|e˜,Λ | E˜ = e˜) +
∑
e˜⊆{1,2,...,n}
pE˜(e˜)I(K0,K1;X|e˜ |X|e˜,Λ, E˜ = e˜) + o(n)
≤
∑
e˜⊆{1,2,...,n}
pE˜(e˜)I(K0,K1;X|e˜,Λ | E˜ = e˜) +
∑
e˜⊆{1,2,...,n}
pE˜(e˜)H(X |e˜ | E˜ = e˜) + o(n)
≤ I(K0,K1;Z,Λ) +
∑
e˜⊆{1,2,...,n}
pE˜(e˜)|e˜|+ o(n)
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= I(K0,K1;Z,Λ) + nǫ2 + o(n)
(c)
= nǫ2 + o(n)
where (a) follows from Lemma 5, (b) from the independence of Eve’s channel, and (c) from (11). Therefore,
r1P =
m
n
≤
ǫ2
2
+
o(n)
n
IV. OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER OVER A WIRETAPPED CHANNEL IN THE MALICIOUS MODEL : PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In this setup (see Figure 2), Alice and Bob are required to achieve OT, with 2-privacy, in the presence of Eve
when both Alice and Bob can be malicious. We show that for this problem, any
R <


ǫ1ǫ2, ǫ1 ≤
1
2
ǫ1ǫ2(1 − ǫ1), ǫ1 >
1
2
is an achievable 2-private rate. The protocol we give for proving the achievability of R is described separately for
the regimes ǫ1 ≤ 1/2 and ǫ1 > 1/2, since the protocol differs substantially in these two regimes.
A. Protocol when ǫ1 ≤ 1/2
In this regime, our protocol (Protocol 3) is an adaptation of the protocol described for two-party OT with malicious
users in [10], [12] and [13]. Bob forms the tuples of indices L0,L1 and communicates these tuples to Alice. In
contrast, recall that in the honest-but-curious case Bob communicated sets L0, L1 to Alice. Also, unlike the honest-
but-curious case, a small fraction of both tuples is now allocated for use in checks that Alice performs to detect
possible malicious behavior by Bob. These checks are based on interactive hashing [10], which also provides a
mechanism for Bob to detect possible malicious behavior by Alice. Interactive hashing is an interactive protocol
between two users over a noiseless channel, one acting as a sender and the other acting as a receiver. The input to
the protocol is a bit-string held by the sender. The output of the protocol are two bit-strings of the same lengths
as the input bit-string, both available to the sender as well as the receiver. Of the two output strings, one is the
same as the input string but the receiver cannot make out which one of the two it is. The sender, of course, knows
which of the output strings was the input for the protocol but it cannot influence the choice of the other string being
output by the protocol. Appendix B states the properties and describes a protocol for interactive hashing, as given
in [10]. While using interactive hashing in our protocol, Bob acts as the sender and Alice acts as the receiver. The
following explains our protocol in more detail.
Alice initiates the protocol by transmitting a sequence X of n i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2) bits over the channel. Bob
and Eve receive the channel outputs Y and Z respectively. Let E be the set of all the indices at which Y is erased
and E that of all the indices at which Y is unerased. If |E| or |E| are not sufficiently close to their respective
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expected values, Bob aborts the protocol since he does not have enough of either erasures or non-erasures to run
the protocol. Bob now has to form two equal-sized, disjoint tuples of indices, LU and LU , each tuple consisting
of about n/2 indices. The good tuple LU is picked uniformly at random from E. To form the bad tuple LU ,
Bob first uniformly at random selects a subset J ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , |{LU}|}, with |J | being about (1/2 − ǫ1)n. The
elements LU |J are chosen uniformly at random from elements of E\{LU} while the elements LU |Jc are chosen
uniformly at random from elements of E. Here, Jc is the set {1, 2, . . . , |{LU}|}\J . Note that |E| will be nearly
equal to |{LU}|+ |J |. Bob reveals L0,L1 to Alice. Conditioned on Alice’s view, L0,L1 are uniformly distributed
tuples of indices. This uniform distribution prevents leakage of any information about J , and thereby U , to Alice,
when Alice sees L0,L1. Thereafter, Bob and Alice initiate interactive hashing, with a bit-string S representing J
being the input to interactive hashing. As the output of interactive hashing, both Alice and Bob receive some pair
of strings S0,S1 which represent some subsets J0, J1 respectively. Suppose JΦ = J where the random variable
Φ ∈ {0, 1}. In a crucial step designed to catch a malicious Bob, Bob is now required to reveal the bits of X at
indices LU |JΦ and at indices LU |JΦ . An honest Bob knows these bits fully. And we prove later that if Bob cheats
by populating LU with more than the designated number of elements from E, Bob will fail to reveal all the bits
of X at indices LU |JΦ with high probability. As in the honest-but-curious setup, Alice forms two keys to encrypt
her strings, where both the keys are secret from Eve. Towards this goal, Alice randomly and independently selects
two functions F0, F1 from a universal2 class of functions F (see Appendix A for its definition). The required keys
are F0(X|L0) and F1(X|L1). Alice now sends F0, F1,K0 ⊕ F0(X |L0),K1 ⊕ F1(X|L1) to Bob over the public
channel. An honest Bob knows X|LU and can obtain KU . As we will show, a malicious Bob colluding with Eve,
if not caught already, learns a vanishingly small amount of information about at least one of the two keys and, as
a result, can learn only a vanishing amount of information about the corresponding string.
B. Protocol when ǫ1 > 1/2
Our protocol for this regime (Protocol 4) is the main novelty in this section. The above approach, where Bob
gets to choose both the tuples of indices L0,L1, does not work in this regime. To see why this is the case, consider
the setup with ǫ1 = 2/3, ǫ2 = 1/2. In this setup, Y is unerased at about n/3 indices. An honest Bob, therefore,
will construct the tuples L0,L1 with each tuple consisting of about n/3 indices approximately. The good tuple
LU will have nearly all the unerased indices in Y . A malicious Bob who wishes to remain undetected by Alice
will also, hence, form tuples having about n/3 indices each. However, a malicious Bob colluding with Eve has
access to about 2n/3 indices at which he knows the bits transmitted by Alice. As a result, malicious Bob can form
the two tuples L0,L1 consisting only of those indices at which he knows the bits transmitted by Alice. In such
a situation, Bob will pass any check that Alice may impose, without getting caught, and will get to learn both of
Alice’s strings. At the root of this problem is Bob’s ability to choose both tuples L0,L1. Our protocol takes away
8The parameters δ, |δ˜|, δ′ can be chosen to be arbitrarily small so that this rate can take any desired value less than ǫ1ǫ2. Note that when
ǫ1 = 1/2, we need δ˜ < 0 and we can choose δ = −2δ˜. For ǫ1 < 1/2, we choose δ˜ > 0.
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Protocol 3 Malicious Users, ǫ1 ≤ 1/2
Parameters : • γ = (12 − ǫ1 − δ˜), δ˜ ∈ (−1, 1) such that γ > 0, γ ∈ Q
• β = (12 − δ − δ˜), δ ∈ (0, 1) such that β > 0, β ∈ Q
• δ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that (ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ′) > 0, (ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ′) ∈ Q
• βn, γn, (ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ′)n ∈ N
• The rate8of the protocol is (ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ′)
• I = {1, 2, . . . , βn}
• m =
⌈
log(βnCγn)
⌉
• T = {(A) : A ⊂ I, |A| = γn}
• Q : {0, 1}m −→ T is an onto map
1: Alice transmits an n-tuple X of i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2)
bits over the channel.
2: Bob receives the n-tuple Y from BEC(ǫ1). Bob
forms the sets
E := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Yi 6= ⊥}
E := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Yi = ⊥}
If |E| < (β + γ)n or |E| < (β − γ)n, Bob aborts
the protocol.
3: Bob chooses a bit-string S ∼ Unif({0, 1}m). Let
J = Q(S) and Jc = (I\{J}). Bob forms the tuples
LU ,LU ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
βn as follows:
LU,i ∼ Unif{E\{Li−1U }}
LU,Ji ∼ Unif{E\{{LU} ∪ {LU |Ji−1}}}
LU,Jci
∼ Unif{E\{LU |Jc,i−1}}
Bob reveals the tuples L0,L1 over the public chan-
nel.
4: Alice checks to see that {L0}∩{L1} = ∅, otherwise
Alice aborts the protocol.
5: Bob and Alice initiate interactive hashing, with the
input to interactive hashing being the string S held
by Bob. Interactive hashing returns strings S0,S1 ∈
{0, 1}m, which are available to both Alice and Bob.
Let Φ ∈ {0, 1} such that SΦ = S. Let
J0 = Q(S0)
J1 = Q(S1)
6: Bob now sends the following to Alice over the public
channel: Θ = Φ⊕ U , Y |L0|J
Θ
, Y |L1|JΘ .
7: Alice checks that Y |L0|J
Θ
completely matches
X|L0|J
Θ
and Y |L1|JΘ completely matches
X|L1|JΘ , otherwise Alice aborts the protocol.
8: Alice chooses functions F0, F1, randomly and in-
dependently, from a family F of universal2 hash
functions :
F0, F1 : {0, 1}
βn −→ {0, 1}(ǫ1ǫ2−5δ−2δ˜−δ
′)n
Alice finally send the following to Bob over the
public channel:
F0, F1, K0 ⊕ F0(X |L0), K1 ⊕ F1(X|L1)
9: Bob knows FU and Y |LU and can, therefore, re-
cover KU .
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this ability from Bob, allowing Bob to form only one of the tuples, with the other tuple being provided to Bob by
interactive hashing. Thus, interactive hashing is used to output tuples using which the keys that encrypt Alice’s
strings are derived. We describe the protocol in more detail below.
The steps in this protocol are the same as for the protocol in the regime ǫ1 ≤ 1/2, upto and including the
formation of sets E,E by Bob. There are two main differences thereafter. Firstly, L0, L1 are now random sets, not
random tuples. Secondly, Bob is allowed to construct only the good set LU , not the bad set LU . The set LU is
obtained as an output of interactive hashing when interactive hashing is invoked with the bit-string representing LU
as its input. Specifically, suppose the sets LU , LU are required to be of cardinality βn, where 0 < β < 1/2. Let
m be the smallest integer required so that each βn-sized subset of {1, 2, . . . , n} can be represented with a unique
m-bit string. Bob selects one of these m-bit strings, say S, to represent its choice of LU . Of course, the choice of
the string S should be such that LU ⊂ E. Alice and Bob now initiate interactive hashing. Bob holds S as the input
to interactive hashing and both Alice and Bob receive as outputs some strings S0,S1, one of which is the same as
S. The strings S0,S1 identify subsets L0, L1 one of which is LU and the other is used as LU . The key property
used to guarantee privacy against malicious Bob is the following: The sets L0, L1 cannot simultaneously have more
than a threshold number each of indices at which either Y or Z or both are unerased. That is, at least one of L0, L1
has fewer than this threshold number of such indices. And our protocol effectively removes that threshold number
of such indices each from L0, L1. This removal happens in two steps: in the first step, Bob is asked to reveal bits
X|L0∩L1 as a check by Alice and indices L0 ∩ L1 are not used thereafter. In the second step, sufficient privacy
amplification is used over the bits X|L0\L0∩L1 and X|L1\L0∩L1 , with the outputs of privacy amplification used as
the keys to encrypt Alice’s strings. This two-step process guarantees that a malicious Bob, colluding with Eve, can
gain only a vanishingly small amount of information about at least one of the keys. Privacy against a malicious
Alice, colluding with Eve, is based on the fact that Alice cannot make out which of the strings S0,S1 was the
input string S. Specifically, suppose Φ is a binary random variable such that SΦ = S. Then, conditioned on the
combined views of Alice and Eve, Φ is uniformly distributed. Bob, who knows Φ, uses Φ to mask any leakage of
information about U to a malicious Alice. Note that unlike Protocol 3, there is no J used in the current protocol.
Thus, only random sets of indices L0, L1, as opposed to random tuples of indices, suffice to help prevent leaking
U to Alice.
We prove the following lemma which, essentially, proves Theorem 3.
Lemma 6 Let R <


ǫ1ǫ2, ǫ1 ≤
1
2
ǫ1ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1 >
1
2

. Then, there exists a sequence of protocols (Pn)n∈N, with
corresponding rates (rn)n∈N such that rn −→ R and:
(a) When Alice and Bob are both honest, Pn aborts with vanishing probability and (4)-(7) are satisfied for (Pn)n∈N,
as n −→∞.
9The β can be chosen arbitrarily close to (1 − ǫ1) and the δ′ can be chosen to be arbitrarily small so that this rate can take any desired
value less than ǫ1ǫ2(1 − ǫ1).
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Protocol 4 Malicious Users, ǫ1 > 1/2
Parameters : • β ∈ [0, 1− ǫ1) ∩Q, H(β) ∈ R\Q. Such a β value, arbitrarily close to (1− ǫ1), exists
as a consequence of Lemma 20.
• δ = (1 − ǫ1 − β)
• δ′ ∈ (0, 1) is such that (ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ′) > 0, (ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ′) ∈ Q
• βn, βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ′) ∈ N, < log nCβn > −→ 1 as n −→ ∞. Such a sequence of
natural numbers is possible using Lemma 15
• The rate9of the protocol is β(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ′)
• I = {1, 2, . . . , n}
• m = ⌈log(nCβn)⌉
• T = {A ⊂ I : |A| = βn}
• B ⊂ {0, 1}m such that |B| = |T |, Bc = {0, 1}m\B
• Q : B −→ T is a bijective map
1: Alice transmits an n-tuple X of i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2)
bits over the channel.
2: Bob receives the n-tuple Y from BEC(ǫ1). Bob
forms the sets
E := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Yi 6= ⊥}
E := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Yi = ⊥}
If |E| < βn, Bob aborts the protocol.
3: Bob defines the collection of good sets as:
TG := {G ⊂ E : |G| = βn}
Let BG = Q−1(TG), where
Q−1(TG) := {b ∈ B : Q(b) ∈ TG}
4: Bob picks a m-bit string S ∈ BG ∪ Bc as follows:
P [S = s] =


1
|BG|
· |B|2m , s ∈ BG
1
|Bc| ·
(
1− |B|2m
)
, s ∈ Bc
0, otherwise
Note that the channel acts independently on each bit
transmitted by Alice and Alice does not know the
erasure pattern seen by Bob. Thus, conditioned on
Alice’s view, S is uniform over all m-bit strings.
5: Bob and Alice initiate interactive hashing with the
input to interactive hashing being the string S held
by Bob. As a result, both Alice and Bob receive
S0,S1 ∈ {0, 1}m as the output of interactive hash-
ing. If either S0 ∈ Bc or S1 ∈ Bc, then Alice and
Bob abort the protocol. Otherwise, let Φ ∈ {0, 1}
such that SΦ = S and let
L0 = Q(S0)
L1 = Q(S1)
6: If we have
β − δ ≤
1
βn
|L0 ∩ L1| ≤ β + δ
then the protocol moves to the next step. Otherwise,
Alice and Bob abort the protocol.
7: Bob reveals Θ = Φ⊕U and Y |L0∩L1 over the public
channel.
8: Alice checks to see that Y |L0∩L1 exactly matches
X|L0∩L1 , otherwise Alice aborts the protocol.
9: Alice randomly and independently selects functions
F0, F1 from a family F of universal2 hash functions:
F0, F1 : {0, 1}
βn−|L0∩L1| −→ {0, 1}βn(ǫ1ǫ2−3δ−δ
′)
Alice finally sends the following information over
the public channel:
F0, F1, K0⊕F0(X|LΘ\L0∩L1), K1⊕F1(X|LΘ\L0∩L1)
10: Bob knows FU and Y |LΦ\L0∩L1 and can, therefore,
recover KU .
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(b) When Alice is malicious and colludes with Eve and Bob is honest, let Vn be the final view of a malicious Alice
colluding with Eve at the end of Pn. Then, I(U ;Vn) −→ 0 for (Pn)n∈N, as n −→∞.
(c) When Alice is honest and Bob is malicious and colludes with Eve, let Vn be the final view of a malicious Bob
colluding with Eve at the end of Pn. Then, min{I(K0;Vn), I(K1;Vn)} −→ 0 as n −→∞.
This lemma is proved in Appendix D. A short sketch of its proof now follows. The protocol sequence (Pn)n∈N
we consider is a sequence of Protocol 3 instances when ǫ1 ≤ 1/2 and of Protocol 4 instances otherwise.
• In the statement of Lemma 6(a), Alice and Bob are assumed to be honest. When that is the case, we show that
the numerous checks in Pn pass with high probability. The arguments showing that the checks pass w.h.p. use
the Chernoff’s bound, properties of interactive hashing or disjoint construction of sets/tuples depending on the
particular check. Since all checks pass with high probability, effectively, these checks cease to matter in Pn.
We argue that in this case, Pn is essentially the same as Protocol 1 and rn −→ R as n −→ ∞. Specifically,
in Pn, just like in Protocol 1, Alice creates two keys both secret from Eve and only one known to Bob. Alice
uses these keys to encrypt her strings. As shown previously for Protocol 1, such keys are sufficient for the
protocol sequence to satisfy (4)-(7) in this setup with honest-but-curious users.
• In the statement of Lemma 6(b), it is assumed that Bob is honest and Alice is malicious and possibly colludes
with Eve. The goal in Pn is to prevent such an Alice from learning U . In Pn, Bob and Alice initiate interactive
hashing where Bob holds an input for interactive hashing and the two outputs of interactive hashing are received
by both Alice and Bob. One of these outputs is the same as the input held by Bob. The guarantee is that Alice
cannot make out which of the two outputs is the one Bob held as input to interactive hashing. Specifically,
suppose Φ is a binary random variable indicating which of the two outputs was the input to interactive hashing.
Then, we show that conditioned on the combined views of Alice and Eve, Φ is uniformly distributed. Bob, of
course, knows Φ and uses it to mask any leakage of information about U . As a result, Alice and Eve together
cannot learn anything about U .
• In the statement of Lemma 6(c), it is assumed that Alice is honest and Bob is malicious and possibly colludes
with Eve. The goal in Pn is to prevent such a Bob from learning a non-negligible amount of information
about both of Alice’s strings. When ǫ1 ≤ 1/2, a malicious Bob may swap some of the good indices (unerased
in Y or Z or both) from LU with the bad indices (erased in both Y and Z) of LU , to gain information
about both of Alice’s strings. This leaves both LU ,LU with a large number of bad indices. After Bob and
Alice complete the interactive hashing, both of them receive as outputs some subsets JΦ, JΦ where JΦ is the
same as the subset Bob held as the input to interactive hashing. In a check imposed by Alice, Bob is asked
to reveal the bits of X at indices LU |JΦ ,LU |JΦ . An honest Bob knows the required bits, by design in Pn.
However, this check creates a problem for malicious Bob for the following reason. By a property of interactive
hashing, Bob cannot influence the choice of JΦ. If Bob has behaved maliciously, we show that w.h.p several
of the indices in LU |JΦ will be the bad indices of LU . As a result, w.h.p. malicious Bob cannot reveal all
the bits sent by Alice at the indices LU |JΦ and, therefore, fails this check. When ǫ1 > 1/2, both Alice and
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Bob receive the sets L0, L1 as the output of interactive hashing. Interactive hashing guarantees that w.h.p. at
least one of the sets L0, L1 has fewer than a threshold number of good indices. Through a two-step process,
this threshold number of good indices are effectively removed from both L0, L1. As a result, at least one out
of L0, L1 has, effectively, no good indices left at the end. Thus, at least one of keys created by Alice will be
unknown to a malicious Bob. Consequently, malicious Bob cannot gain any information about at least one of
Alice’s strings.
V. INDEPENDENT OBLIVIOUS TRANSFERS OVER A BROADCAST CHANNEL : PROOF OF THEOREM 4
There are three users Alice, Bob and Cathy in this setup (see Figure 4). The goal is to achieve independent OTs,
with 2-privacy, between Alice-Bob and Alice-Cathy. Specifically, we show that the rate-region R of independent
pairs of OTs, with 2-privacy, for honest-but-curious Alice, Bob and Cathy is such that
Rinner ⊆ R ⊆ Router
where
Rinner =
{
(RB , RC) ∈ R
2
+ : RB ≤ ǫ2min{ǫ1, 1− ǫ1},
RC ≤ ǫ1min{ǫ2, 1− ǫ2},
RB +RC ≤ ǫ2 ·min{ǫ1, 1− ǫ1}
+ ǫ1 ·min{ǫ2, 1− ǫ2}
−min{ǫ1, 1− ǫ1} ·min{ǫ2, 1− ǫ2}
}
.
and
Router =
{
(RB, RC) ∈ R
2
+ : RB ≤ ǫ2 ·min{ǫ1, 1− ǫ1},
RC ≤ ǫ1 ·min{ǫ2, 1− ǫ2},
RB +RC ≤ ǫ1 · ǫ2
}
.
A. Proof of inner bound : Rinner ⊆ R
It suffices to show that any rate pair (rB , rC), with rB < C2P and rC < max{0, (2ǫ1−1)·min{ǫ2, 1−ǫ2}}, is an
achievable 2-private rate-pair. An analogous argument, with the roles of Bob and Cathy reversed, will show that any
rate-pair (rB , rC), with rB < max{0, (2ǫ2−1)·min{ǫ1, 1−ǫ1}} and rC < C2P , is also an achievable 2-private rate-
pair. Coupled with a time-sharing argument, this proves the inner bound Rinner ⊆ R. Consequently, we describe a
protocol (Protocol 5) for achieving any rate-pair (rB , rC) when rB < C2P , rC < max{0, (2ǫ1−1)·min{ǫ2, 1−ǫ2}},
in the setup of Figure 4. A sequence of Protocol 5 instances, with rate-pair approaching (rB , rC), is shown to satisfy
(12)-(19). This establishes that (rB , rC) is an achievable 2-private rate.
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Our protocol has two distinct phases. The first phase is the same as Protocol 1, achieving a rate rB < C2P of
OT for Bob with 2-privacy. If ǫ1 > 1/2, a second phase begins after the first phase ends. This second phase is
the two-party OT protocol of [2] (the two users being Alice and Cathy), which runs over the segment of Alice’s
transmissions that remained unused during the first phase. Note that this unused segment of Alice’s transmissions
is completely erased for Bob and is about (2ǫ1 − 1)n bits long. This second phase, thus, achieves an OT rate of
rC < max{0, (2ǫ1 − 1) ·min{ǫ2, 1− ǫ2}}, with 2-privacy, for Cathy.
Protocol 5 Protocol for achieving any rate pair (rB , rC) such that rB < C2P , rC < max{0, (2ǫ1− 1)min{ǫ2, 1−
ǫ2}}
Parameters : • δ ∈ (0, 1) such that rB < (ǫ2 − δ)(min{ǫ1, 1− ǫ1} − δ) and (ǫ2 − δ) ∈ Q
• 0 < δ˜ < rB , δ˜ ∈ Q
• β = rBǫ2−δ
• βn, n(rB − δ˜) ∈ N
• Bob’s rate10in the Protocol is (rB − δ˜)
1: Alice transmits an n-tuple X of i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2)
bits over the channel.
2: Bob receives the n-tuple Y from BEC(ǫ1). Bob
forms the sets
E := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Yi 6= ⊥}
E := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Yi = ⊥}
If |E| < βn or |E| < βn, Bob aborts the protocol.
3: Bob creates the following sets:
LU ∼ Unif{A ⊂ E : |A| = βn}
LU ∼ Unif{A ⊂ E : |A| = βn}
If ǫ1 >
1
2
L ∼ Unif{A ⊂ E\LU : |A| = (ǫ1 − δ − β)n}
Else
L = ∅
Bob reveals L0, L1, L to Alice over the public
channel.
4: Alice randomly and independently chooses functions
F0, F1 from a family F of universal2 hash functions:
F0, F1 : {0, 1}
βn −→ {0, 1}n(rB−δ˜)
Alice finally sends the following information on the
public channel:
F0, F1, K0 ⊕ F0(X |L0), K1 ⊕ F1(X|L1)
5: Bob knows FU ,X|LU and can, therefore, recover
KU .
6: If L 6= ∅, Alice and Cathy follow the two-party OT
protocol [2] over X|L, to obtain OT for Cathy at
rate rC .
Lemma 7 Any rate-pair (rB , rC), such that rB < C2P , rC < max{0, (2ǫ1− 1)min{ǫ2, 1− ǫ2}}, is an achievable
10The parameters δ, δ˜ can be chosen to be arbitrarily small so that Bob’s rate can take any desired value less than C2P . The two-party OT
protocol ensures that Cathy’s rate rC can take any desired value less than max{0, (2ǫ1 − 1)min{ǫ2, 1− ǫ2}}.
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2-private rate-pair, with honest-but-curious users, for the setup of Figure 4
This lemma is proved in Appendix E-A.
B. Proof of outer bound : R ⊆ Router
We show that our outer-bound holds under a weaker privacy requirement, wherein the left-hand-sides of (14),
(18) and (19) are multiplied by 1/n. Let (rB , rC) be an achievable 2-private rate pair, for the setup in Figure 4.
Then, the following are straightforward upperbounds as a consequence of Theorem 1:
rB ≤ ǫ2 ·min{ǫ1, 1− ǫ1}
rC ≤ ǫ1 ·min{ǫ2, 1− ǫ2}
To prove that rB + rC ≤ ǫ1ǫ2, we use the following lemma (proved in Appendix E-B):
Lemma 8
1
n
H(K0,K1,J0,J1|X,Λ) −→ 0 as n −→∞
Intuitively, this lemma says that anyone observing Alice’s interface to the rest of the system, namely signals
X,Λ, should be able to recover all the four strings K0,K1,J0,J1. Suppose this was not true and, say, K0
cannot be decoded from X,Λ. In this case, Alice will infer that Bob wanted K1, that is U = 1, which violates
(15). Similarly, if J1 cannot be decoded from X,Λ, Alice will infer that Cathy wanted J0, that is W = 0, which
violates (16).
Let E˜ := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Yi = ⊥ and Zi = ⊥}. Let e˜ denote a realization of E˜ and let e˜ = {1, 2, . . . , n}\e˜.
Now,
mB +mC = H(KU ,JW )
= I(KU ,JW ;X,Λ, U,W ) +H(KU ,JW |X,Λ, U,W )
≤ I(KU ,JW ;X,Λ, U,W ) +H(KU ,KU ,JW ,JW |X,Λ, U,W )
= I(KU ,JW ;X,Λ, U,W ) +H(K0,K1,J0,J1 | X,Λ, U,W )
≤ I(KU ,JW ;X,Λ, U,W ) +H(K0,K1,J0,J1 | X,Λ)
(a)
= I(KU ,JW ;X,Λ, U,W ) + o(n)
≤ I(KU ,JW ;X,Λ, U,W, E˜) + o(n)
(b)
= I(KU ,JW ;X,Λ, U,W | E˜) + o(n)
=
∑
e˜⊆{1,2,...,n}
pE˜(e˜)I(KU ,JW ;X,Λ, U,W | E˜ = e˜) + o(n)
=
∑
e˜⊆{1,2,...,n}
pE˜(e˜)I(KU ,JW ;X|e˜,Λ, U,W | E˜ = e˜) +
∑
e˜⊆{1,2,...,n}
pE˜(e˜)I(KU ,JW ;X|e˜ | X|e˜,Λ, U,W, E˜ = e˜)
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+ o(n)
≤
∑
e˜⊆{1,2,...,n}
pE˜(e˜)I(KU ,JW ;X|e˜,Λ, U,W | E˜ = e˜) +
∑
e˜⊆{1,2,...,n}
pE˜(e˜)H(X|e˜ | E˜ = e˜) + o(n)
≤ I(KU ,JW ;Y ,Z,Λ, U,W | E˜) +
∑
e˜⊆{1,2,...,n}
pE˜(e˜)|e˜|+ o(n)
(c)
= I(KU ,JW ;Y ,Z,Λ, U,W, E˜) + nǫ1ǫ2 + o(n)
(d)
= I(KU ,JW ;Y ,Z,Λ, U,W ) + nǫ1ǫ2 + o(n)
(e)
= nǫ1ǫ2 + o(n)
where (a) follows from Lemma 8, (b) and (c) follow since E˜ is independent of (K0,K1,J0,J1, U,W ), (d) follows
since E˜ is a function of (Y ,Z) and (e) follows from a weakened version (multiplication by 1/n) of (14). As a
result,
rB + rC =
mB
n
+
mC
n
≤ ǫ1ǫ2 +
o(n)
n
VI. OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER OVER A DEGRADED WIRETAPPED CHANNEL : PROOF OF THEOREM 5
In this setup (see Figure 6), Alice is connected to Bob and Eve by a broadcast channel made up of a cascade of
two independent BECs. There is a BEC(ǫ1) connecting Alice to Bob and a BEC(ǫ2) connecting Bob to Eve. The
goal is to achieve OT between Alice and Bob, with 1-privacy. For the 1-private OT capacity C1P , we show that :
min
{
1
3
ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1
}
≤ C1P ≤ min{ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1}
A. Proof of lower bound: min {(1/3) · ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1}
We describe a protocol (Protocol 6) for achieving any 1-private rate r < min {(1/3) · ǫ2(1 − ǫ1), ǫ1}, with honest-
but-curious users, in the setup of Figure 6. For a sequence of Protocol 6 instances of rate r < min {(1/3) · ǫ2(1 − ǫ1), ǫ1},
we show that (8)-(11) hold. This establishes that any r < min {(1/3) · ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1} is an achievable 1-private
rate. All the protocols seen thus far for honest-but-curious users critically depended on the fact that the erasure
patterns received by Bob and Eve (or Cathy) were independent. This is the reason why Bob could send the sets
L0, L1 over the public channel and Eve (or Cathy) could not deduce U from these sets. However, the present setup
has a physically degraded channel, degraded in favor of Bob. If Bob sends sets L0, L1 as in previous protocols,
then Eve will see that one of the sets of indices corresponds entirely to erasures in Z (the bad set LU ) while the
other set corresponds only partially to erasures in Z (the good set LU ). As a result, Eve will learn U as soon as
Bob sends L0, L1 over the public channel. Our protocol overcomes this problem by having Bob efficiently encrypt
the sets L0, L1, using a long secret key shared with Alice and secret from Eve, before transmitting the sets on
the public channel. Furthermore, one of these sets of indices corresponds entirely to erasures both in Y and Z,
something that was not true when Bob and Eve received independent erasure patterns. Our protocol makes use of
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this feature to reduce the length of the secret key it needs to encrypt Alice’s strings before transmitting them to
Bob over the public channel. A more detailed description of the protocol now follows.
Protocol 6 Protocol for achieving any r < min {(1/3) · ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1}
Parameters : • δ ∈ (0, 1) such that r < min{ 13 (ǫ2 − δ)(1− ǫ1 − δ), (ǫ1 − δ)}, (ǫ2 − δ) ∈ Q
• 0 < δ˜ < r, δ˜ ∈ Q
• β = r−δ˜ǫ2−δ
• βn, βn(ǫ2 − δ), 2βn
(
r
r−δ˜
)
, βn(1− (ǫ2 − δ)), n(r − 2δ˜) ∈ N
• The rate11of the protocol is (r − 2δ˜)
1: Alice transmits an n-tuple X of i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2)
bits over the channel.
2: Bob receives the n-tuple Y from BEC(ǫ1). Bob
forms the sets
E := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Yi 6= ⊥}
E := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Yi = ⊥}
If |E| < (1 − ǫ1 − δ)n or |E| < (ǫ1 − δ)n, Bob
aborts the protocol.
3: Bob creates the following sets:
LU ∼ Unif{A ⊂ E : |A| = βn(ǫ2 − δ)}
LU ∼ Unif{A ⊂ E : |A| = βn(ǫ2 − δ)}
G˜ := E\LU
B˜ := E\LU
Bob reveals G˜, B˜ to Alice over the public channel.
4: Let L˜ = (L0 ∪ L1). Bob forms the tuple Q ∈
{0, 1}2βn(ǫ2−δ) such that :
Qi =


0, L˜i ∈ L0
1, L˜i ∈ L1
5: Bob forms the set G˜L consisting of the first 2βn ·
r/(r− δ˜) elements from (G˜). Bob forms the set G˜S
consisting of the next βn(1−(ǫ2−δ)) elements from
(G˜).
6: Bob randomly selects a function FL from a family
FL of universal2 hash functions, given as:
FL : {0, 1}
(
r
r−δ˜
)
2βn
−→ {0, 1}2βn(ǫ2−δ)
Bob now sends the following to Alice over the public
channel : FL,Q⊕ FL(X|G˜L).
7: Alice recovers Q from FL,Q ⊕ FL(X |G˜L). Using
Q, G˜ and B˜, Alice recovers L0, L1. Alice now ran-
domly and independently chooses functions F0, F1
from a family F of universal2 hash functions, given
as:
F0, F1 : {0, 1}
βn −→ {0, 1}n(r−2δ˜)
Alice finally sends the following information on the
public channel:
F0, F1, K0⊕F0(X|L0∪G˜S ), K1⊕F1(X|L1∪G˜S )
8: Bob knows FU ,X|LU∪G˜S and can, therefore, re-
cover KU .
Alice initiates the protocol by transmitting a sequence X of n i.i.d. uniform bits over the channel. Bob and Eve
receive the channel outputs Y and Z respectively, where Z is an erased version of Y . Bob denotes by E the set
11The parameters δ, δ˜ can be chosen to be arbitrarily small so that this rate can take any desired value less than min {(1/3) · ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1}.
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of indices at which Y was erased and by E the complement of E. Out of E, Bob uniformly at random picks up a
good set LU of cardinality about nr. In a similar manner, Bob picks the bad set LU out of E, with |LU | = |LU |.
Let G˜ = E\LU and B˜ = E\LU . Note that |G˜| is about n(1− ǫ1 − r). Bob reveals the set of indices G˜ and B˜ to
Alice over the public channel. Out of an ordered version of the set of indices G˜, Bob takes the first approximately
|L0 ∪L1|/ǫ2 elements and calls it the set G˜L and takes the next approximately |L0|(1− ǫ2)/ǫ2 elements and calls
it the set G˜S . For r < min {(1/3) · ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1}, |G˜L|+ |G˜S | ≤ |G˜| and so the sets G˜L, G˜S of the required sizes
can be derived from the set G˜. The purpose of forming G˜L and G˜S is to use them to form two different secret
keys, known to Alice and Bob but secret from Eve.
Bob’s goal now is to transmit L0, L1 to Alice without revealing them to Eve. Towards this goal, Bob does two
things: Firstly, Bob considers the ordered version L of L0 ∪ L1 and forms the binary |L0 ∪ L1|-tuple Q such that
Qi = 0 when Li ∈ L0 and Qi = 1 when Li ∈ L1, i = 1, 2, . . . , |L0 ∪L1|. Secondly, Bob forms a secret key using
G˜L that is |L0 ∪ L1| bits long, which Alice knows and Eve does not know, as follows. Bob randomly selects a
function FL from a universal2 class FL, whose input is about |L0∪L1|/ǫ2 bits long and whose output is |L0∪L1|
bits long. Then, FL(X |G˜L) is the secret key Bob is looking for. Bob sends FL,Q ⊕ F (X|G˜L) to Alice over the
public channel. Alice recovers L0, L1 from this message while Eve cannot separate out L0, L1 from L0 ∪ L1.
Alice now forms two independent keys to encrypt its strings and send these encrypted strings to Bob. One of
these keys is known to Bob and none of the keys is known to Eve. For this, Alice randomly selects two functions
F0, F1 from a family F of universal2 hash functions, whose input is about (|L0|+ |G˜S |)/ǫ2 bits long and whose
output is about |L0| bits long. Then, F0(X |L0∪G˜S) and F1(X|L1∪G˜S ) are the keys Alice wants. Note that Bob
does not know the key FU (X |LU∪G˜S ) even though Bob knows X |G˜S . This is a direct consequence of privacy
amplification on X|LU∪G˜S by FU , coupled with the facts that X |LU is erased for Bob and the key FU (X |LU∪G˜S )
is about the same length as |LU |. Alice finally sends F0, F1,K0⊕F0(X |L0∪G˜S),K1⊕F1(X |L1∪G˜S) to Bob over
the public channel. Bob knows X|LU∪G˜S and can recover KU from Alice’s message.
Lemma 9 Any rate r < min {(1/3) · ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1} is an achievable 1-private rate, with honest-but-curious users,
for the setup of Figure 6.
This lemma is proved in Appendix F. Here we give a sketch of this proof. Let (Pn){n∈N} be a sequence of
Protocol 6 instances, of rate r− 2δ˜. If the protocol does not abort, then Bob knows the key SU = FU (X|LU∪G˜S).
This is because Bob knows FU , LU , G˜S ,X|LU ,X|G˜S . As a result, Bob can recover the string KU from Alice’s
public message and so (8) holds for (Pn){n∈N}. Bob does not know the key SU = FU (X |LU∪G˜S), despite knowing
X|G˜S . This is because, by design, |SU | = |LU | and Bob does not know X |LU . Hence, privacy amplification
(Lemma 10) by FU on X|LU∪G˜S ensures that SU appears nearly uniformly distributed to Bob. Thus, Bob does not
learn anything about KU from Alice’s message and so (9) holds for (Pn){n∈N}. (10) holds for (Pn){n∈N} since
Alice cannot learn U upon receiving L0, L1 from Bob, as in previous protocols. Finally, note that the keys SU ,SU
are independent, despite X|G˜S being a common part of the inputs to functions FU , FU that generate these keys.
Furthermore, privacy amplification by FU , FU ensures that Eve knows nothing about SU ,SU . Thus, for the same
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reasons as in previous protocols, (11) holds for (Pn){n∈N}.
B. Proof of upper bound: C1P ≤ min{ǫ2(1 − ǫ1), ǫ1}
The upper bound follows by evaluating the upper bound in (20) for the setup of Figure 6. Intuitively, the upper
bound of ǫ2(1 − ǫ1) follows from the fact that OT capacity is upper bounded by the secret key capacity of the
wiretapped channel. This is because if Bob runs the protocol with the choice bit set deterministically to say 0, then
K0 is a secret key between Alice and Bob. The upper bound follows from the fact that ǫ2(1− ǫ1) is the secret key
capacity of this wiretapped channel with public discussion [1]. The upper bound of ǫ1 follows from the fact that
this is an upper bound for two-party OT capacity of the binary erasure channel with erasure probability ǫ1 [2].
VII. SUMMARY
In this work, we formulated and studied the problem of obtaining 1-of-2 string OT between two users Alice and
Bob in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. The resource for OT is a broadcast channel from Alice to Bob and
Eve. Apart from the usual OT constraints between the users, we additionally require that the eavesdropper learn
nothing about any users’ private data. The wiretapped channel model we introduced in this study (see Figure 1) is a
generalization of the two-pary OT model studied previously [2], [12]. We studied the privacy requirements in our OT
problem under two distinct privacy regimes : 2-privacy, where Eve may collude with either user and 1-privacy where
no such collusion is allowed. When the broadcast channel in the model consists of two independent and parallel
BECs (see Figure 2), we derived the OT capacity both under 2-privacy and under 1-privacy for honest-but-curious
users. These capacity results easily generalize for 1-of-N string OT. Our protocols were extensions of the scheme
presented by Ahlswede and Csisza´r [2], designed to additionally guarantee privacy against Eve. The corresponding
converses were generalizations of the converse arguments in [2]. In the same model, we studied the problem of
obtaining OT when Alice and Bob can behave maliciously and the malicious user can additionally collude with
Eve. For this problem, we obtained an achievable rate which is optimal when ǫ1 ≤ 1/2 and is no more than a
fraction ǫ1 away from optimal when ǫ1 > 1/2. Our protocol for the regime ǫ1 > 1/2 makes novel use of interactive
hashing to directly obtain the keys that encrypt Alice’s strings. For ǫ1 ≤ 1/2, our protocol is an extension of the
protocol presented in [10], [12], [13] and is designed to maintain privacy against the malicious user colluding with
Eve. We studied a generalization of the wiretapped OT model of Figure 2, where the eavesdropper is replaced by a
legitimate user Cathy (see Figure 4). Independent OT is required between Alice-Bob and Alice-Cathy. We derived
inner and outer bounds for the region of achievable rate-pairs. These bounds match except when ǫ1, ǫ2 > 1/2. The
final OT problem we studied considers a physically degraded broadcast channel as the OT resource (see Figure 6).
OT is required between Alice and Bob with 1-privacy. Due to the degraded nature of the channel, Eve has more
information about the noise process in the legitimate users’ channel compared to previous models (where Bob, Eve
got independent erasure patterns). This makes it harder to guarantee privacy for Bob but also presents an opportunity
for reducing the amount of secret keys needed to encrypt Alice’s strings. We obtain upper and lower bounds for
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the OT capacity for this problem. The bounds match when ǫ1 ≤ (1/3) · ǫ2(1 − ǫ1), otherwise the lower bound is
within a factor of 1/3 of the upper bound.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
• In the problem of obtaining OT over a wiretapped channel with malicious users (see Section II-C), our
achievable 2-private rate is ǫ1 · C2P when ǫ1 > 1/2. Here, C2P is the 2-private OT capacity in the same
setup when users are honest-but-curious. The main reason we loose rate in our protocol is that the sets L0, L1
obtained out of interactive hashing are not disjoint. In order to obtain disjoint sets, we never use the indices
L0∩L1. This is quite a sizeable number of indices for an honest Bob to loose out of the good set LU , leading
to a rate loss. If we could get interactive hashing to provide us with disjoint L0, L1, then the achievable rate
can be improved. Specifically, a useful version of interactive hashing would have a subset of {1, 2, . . . , n} as
its input and would provide two disjoint subsets of {1, 2, . . . , n} as outputs. If that is possible without loosing
any property of interactive hashing, we will only have to do the required privacy amplification on L0, L1 and
a higher rate for our problem will become possible.
• In the problem of obtaining independent OTs over a broadcast erasure channel (see Section II-D), there is a
gap between the achievable rate and the outer bound when ǫ1, ǫ2 > 1/2. Our converse technique of evaluating
how much information must remain hidden from any user during OT, which is applicable to any broadcast
channel, does not close this gap. We believe that a more channel-specific insight on the impossibility of meeting
one of the OT requirements can tighten the converse. This kind of a channel-specific converse argument was
successfully employed in characterizing the 1-private OT capacity in the presence of Eve (see Section II-B) in
the regime ǫ2/2 ≤ ǫ1 < 1/2. In the independent OTs problem itself, when all three users are malicious, it is
quite tempting to consider a protocol where Alice invokes two independent interactive hashing based checks.
One of the checks is for Bob and the other for Cathy, to catch malicious Bob or Cathy. This is unlike the
wiretapper model (Alice and Bob can act maliciously, Eve remains passive) where Alice cannot get Eve to
respond to such checks. This difference is what makes the problem of catching a malicious Bob, colluding
with Eve, in the wiretapper model much harder to solve. However, the two-checks approach cannot prevent
attacks such as a denial-of-service attack by Bob to prevent Cathy from getting any OT, or vice-versa. Evolving
a technique to prevent such attacks in our setup has been deferred to a future study.
• A single-server private information retrieval (PIR) problem, closely related to the independent OTs problem
of this paper, was formulated and studied in [17]. This problem has the same setup as the independent OTs
problem, except that Alice holds only a single database of N strings in the PIR problem. Bob and Cathy
want a string of their respective choice from this single database, with 2-privacy. For N = 2, the data transfer
capacity for this PIR problem was derived in [17]. The result uses a novel achievable scheme which is quite
different from the achievable scheme used in the independent OTs problem in this paper. In fact, the achievable
scheme used in the independent OTs problem of this paper turns out to be sub-optimal for the PIR problem.
However, for N > 2, it remains open to characterize the data transfer capacity for the PIR problem.
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• Considering OT using a physically degraded channel (see Section II-E) presents several open problems.
We do not know the 1-private OT capacity, with honest-but-curious users, when (1/3) · ǫ2(1 − ǫ1) < ǫ1.
Characterizing the OT capacity in this regime seems to require a tighter converse, based on a more channel-
specific impossibility argument. We suspect that the 2-private OT capacity in this setup is zero. However, our
brief attempt at showing this has not been successful. It would be quite interesting to devise a scheme for OT
with 2-privacy here. Finally, obtaining OT when users can behave maliciously in this setup appears to require
newer techniques and this problem has been deferred to a future study.
• In all the problems studied in this work, we have assumed unlimited public discussion. It would be interesting
to study these problems when the public discussion rate is also constrained.
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APPENDIX A
UNIVERSAL HASH FUNCTIONS, RE´NYI ENTROPY AND PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
Definition 8 A class F of functions mapping A −→ B is universal2 if, for F ∼ Unif(F) and for any a0, a1 ∈
A, a0 6= a1, we have
P [F (a0) = F (a1)] ≤
1
|B|
The class of all linear maps from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}r is a universal2 class. Several other examples of universal2
classes of functions are given in [14], [15].
Definition 9 Let A be a random variable with alphabet A and distribution pA. The collision probability Pc(A) of
A is defined as the probability that A takes the same value twice in two independent experiments. That is,
Pc(A) =
∑
a∈A
p2A(a)
Definition 10 The Re´nyi entropy of order two of a random variable A is
R(A) = log2
(
1
Pc(A)
)
For an event E , the conditional distribution pA|E is used to define the conditional collision probability Pc(A|E)
and the conditional Re´nyi entropy of order 2, R(A|E).
Lemma 10 (Corollary 4 of [3]) Let PAD be an arbitrary probability distribution, with A ∈ A, D ∈ D, and
let d ∈ D. Suppose R(A|D = d) ≥ c. Let F be a universal2 class of functions mapping A −→ {0, 1}l and
F ∼ Unif(F). Then,
H(F (A)|F,D = d) ≥ l − log(1 + 2l−c)
≥ l −
2l−c
ln 2
APPENDIX B
INTERACTIVE HASHING
Interactive hashing is an interactive protocol between two users, a Sender and a Receiver. The input to interactive
hashing is a string S ∈ {0, 1}k available with Sender. The output of interactive hashing are two strings S0,S1 ∈
{0, 1}k, available to both Sender and Receiver, satisfying the following properties :
Property 1 S0 6= S1
Property 2 ∃Φ ∈ {0, 1} such that SΦ = S.
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Property 3 Suppose Sender and Receiver are both honest. Then,
SΦ ∼ Unif{{0, 1}m\{SΦ}}.
Property 4 Suppose Sender is honest and Receiver is malicious. Let VR, V IHR be Receiver’s views at the beginning
and end of interactive hashing, respectively. Then, for s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}k, s0 6= s1,
P [S = s0|VR] = P [S = s1|VR] =⇒ P [S = s0|V
IH
R ,S0 = s0,S1 = s1] = P [S = s1|V
IH
R ,S0 = s0,S1 = s1] =
1
2
Property 5 Suppose Sender is malicious and Receiver is honest. Let G ⊂ {0, 1}k. Then,
P [S0,S1 ∈ G] ≤ 15.6805×
|G|
2k
Protocol 7 is a protocol for interactive hashing for which the above properties were proved in [10].
Protocol 7 Interactive hashing
Let S be a k-bit string that Sender wishes to send to Receiver. All operations mentioned here are in the binary
field F2.
1: Receiver chooses a (k−1)×k matrix M uniformly
at random from amongst all binary matrices of rank
(k − 1). Let ∆i denote the ith row of M .
2: For 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 do:
(a) Receiver send ∆i to Sender.
(b) Sender responds back with the bit Πi =∆i ·S.
3: Given M and the vector Π = (Π1,Π2, . . . ,Πk−1),
Sender and Receiver compute the two solutions of
the linear system M · χ = Π. These solutions are
labelled S0,S1 according to lexicographic order.
APPENDIX C
OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER OVER A WIRETAPPED CHANNEL WITH HONEST-BUT-CURIOUS USERS : PROOFS OF
LEMMAS 1, 2, 5
A. Notations and definitions
• Recall that for both Protocol 1 and Protocol 2:
VA =K0,K1,X,Λ
VB = U,Y ,Λ
VE = Z,Λ
where
Λ = L0, L1, F0, F1,K0 ⊕ F0(X|L0),K1 ⊕ F1(X|L1)
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• Let Ψ = (Ψi : i = 1, 2, . . . , n), where, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n:
Ψi :=


Yi, Yi 6= ⊥
Zi, Zi 6= ⊥
⊥, otherwise
(21)
B. Proof of Lemma 1
In this proof, we use a sequence (Pn)n∈N of Protocol 1 instances of rate (r− δ˜) and we show that (4) - (7) are
satisfied for (Pn)n∈N.
Let Υ be the event that Pn aborts in Step 2. Then, due to Chernoff’s bound, P [Υ = 1] −→ 0 exponentially fast
as n −→∞.
1) To show that (4) is satisfied for (Pn)n∈N, we first note that
P [KˆU 6=KU ] = P [Υ = 0] · P [KˆU 6=KU |Υ = 0] + P [Υ = 1] · P [KˆC 6=KU |Υ = 1]
Since P [Υ = 1]→ 0 exponentially fast, it is sufficient to show that P [KˆU 6=KU |Υ = 0] −→ 0 as n −→∞.
When Υ = 0, Bob knows X|LU . Since Bob also knows FU , Bob can compute the key FU (X|LU ). As a
result, Bob learns KU from KU ⊕ FU (X |LU ) sent by Alice. Hence, P [KˆU 6=KU |Υ = 0] = 0.
2) To show that (5) is satisfied for (Pn)n∈N, we note that
I(KU ;VB, VE) ≤ I(KU ;VB, VE ,Υ)
=
∑
j=0,1
P [Υ = j]I(KU ;VB, VE |Υ = j) + I(KU ; Υ).
Since P [Υ = 1] → 0 exponentially fast and I(KU ; Υ) = 0, it is sufficient to show that I(KU ;VB, VE |Υ =
0) −→ 0 as n −→∞. The rest of this argument is implicitly conditioned on the event Υ = 0, though we do
not explicitly write it in the expressions below.
I(KU ;VB, VE) = I(KU ;U,Y ,Z,Λ)
= I(KU ;U,Y ,Z, L0, L1, F0, F1,K0 ⊕ F0(X|L0),K1 ⊕ F1(X|L1))
= I(KU ;U,Y ,Z, LU , LU , FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X |LU ),KU ⊕ FU (X|LU ))
(a)
= I(KU ;KU ⊕ FU (X|LU )|U,Y ,Z, LU , LU , FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X |LU ))
= H(KU ⊕ FU (X|LU )|U,Y ,Z, LU , LU , FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X|LU ))
−H(FU (X |LU )|KU , U,Y ,Z, LU , LU , FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X |LU ))
(b)
≤ n(r − δ˜)−H(FU (X|LU )|KU , U,Y ,Z, LU , LU , FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X|LU ))
= n(r − δ˜)−H(FU (X|LU )|Ψ|LU ,KU , U,Y ,Z, LU , LU , FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X |LU ))
(c)
= n(r − δ˜)−H(FU (X|LU )|FU ,Ψ|LU )
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where (a) follows since KU ⊥ (U,Y ,Z, LU , LU , FU , FU ,KU ⊕FU (X |LU )), (b) follows since FU (X |LU ) is
n(r− δ˜) bits long and (c) follows since FU (X|LU )−FU ,Ψ|LU−KU , U,Y ,Z, LU , LU , FU ,KU⊕FU (X|LU )
is a Markov chain.
Now, R(X|LU | Ψ|LU = ψ|lu) = #e(ψ|lu). Also, whenever #e(ψ|lu) ≥ (ǫ2 − δ)|lu| = nr, applying
Lemma 10 we get:
H(FU (X|LU ) | FU ,Ψ|LU = ψ|lu) ≥ n(r − δ˜)−
2n(r−δ˜)−nr
ln 2
= n(r − δ˜)−
2−δ˜n
ln 2
We know by Chernoff’s bound that P [#e(Ψ|LU ) ≥ (ǫ2 − δ)|LU |] ≥ 1− ξ, where ξ −→ 0 exponentially fast
as n −→∞. Note that there is an implicit conditioning on the event Υ = 0 here too. Thus,
I(KU ;VB , VE) ≤ n(r − δ˜)−H(FU (X |LU ) | FU ,Ψ|LU )
≤ n(r − δ˜)− (1− ξ)
(
n(r − δ˜)−
2−δ˜n
ln 2
)
= ξn(r − δ˜) + (1 − ξ) ·
2−δ˜n
ln 2
Thus, I(KU ;VB , VE) −→ 0 as n −→∞.
3) To show that (6) is satisfied for (Pn)n∈N, we note that
I(U ;VA, VE) ≤ I(U ;VA, VE ,Υ)
=
∑
j=0,1
P [Υ = j]I(U ;VA, VE |Υ = j) + I(U ; Υ)
Since P [Υ = 1]→ 0 exponentially fast and I(U ; Υ) = 0, it is sufficient to show that I(U ;VA, VE |Υ = 0) −→
0 as n −→ ∞. The rest of this argument is implicitly conditioned on the event Υ = 0, though we do not
explicitly write it in the expressions below.
I(U ;VA, VE) = I(U ;K0,K1,X,Z,Λ)
= I(U ;K0,K1,X,Z, L0, L1, F0, F1,K0 ⊕ F0(X |L0),K1 ⊕ F1(X|L1))
= I(U ;K0,K1,X,Z, L0, L1, F0, F1, F0(X|L0), F1(X |L1))
(a)
= I(U ;X,Z, L0, L1, F0, F1, F0(X|L0), F1(X |L1))
(b)
= I(U ;X,Z, L0, L1)
(c)
= I(U ;L0, L1)
(d)
= 0
where (a) follows since K0,K1 ⊥ (U,X,Z, L0, L1, F0, F1, F0(X|L0), F1(X |L1)), (b) follows since U −
X,Z, L0, L1 − F0, F1, F0(X |L0), F1(X |L1) is a Markov chain, (c) follows since U − L0, L1 −X,Z is a
Markov chain and (d) follows since the channel acts independently on each input bit and |L0| = |L1|.
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4) To show that (7) is satisfied for (Pn)n∈N, we note that
I(K0,K1, U ;VE) ≤ I(K0,K1, U ;VE ,Υ)
=
∑
j=0,1
P [Υ = j]I(K0,K1, U ;VE |Υ = j)
+ I(K0,K1, U ; Υ)
Since P [Υ = 1] −→ 0 exponentially fast and I(K0,K1, U ; Υ) = 0, it is sufficient to show that I(K0,K1, U ;VE |Υ =
0) −→ 0 as n −→∞. The rest of this argument is implicitly conditioned on the event Υ = 0, though we do
not explicitly write it in the expressions below.
I(K0,K1, U ;VE) = I(U ;VE) + I(K0,K1;VE |U)
= I(U ;VE) + I(K0,K1;Z,Λ|U)
= I(U ;VE) + I(K0,K1;Z, L0, L1, F0, F1,K0 ⊕ F0(X |L0),K1 ⊕ F1(X|L1)|U)
= I(U ;VE) + I(K0,K1;K0 ⊕ F0(X |L0),K1 ⊕ F1(X|L1)|U,Z, L0, L1, F0, F1)
= I(U ;VE) +H(K0 ⊕ F0(X|L0),K1 ⊕ F1(X |L1)|U,Z, L0, L1, F0, F1)
−H(F0(X |L0), F1(X|L1)|K0,K1, U,Z, L0, L1, F0, F1)
(a)
≤ I(U ;VE) + 2n(r − δ˜)−H(F0(X |L0), F1(X|L1)|K0,K1, U,Z, L0, L1, F0, F1)
= I(U ;VE) + 2n(r − δ˜)−H(F0(X |L0)|K0,K1, U,Z, L0, L1, F0, F1)
−H(F1(X |L1)|F0(X|L0),K0,K1, U,Z, L0, L1, F0, F1)
(b)
= I(U ;VE) + 2n(r − δ˜)−H(F0(X|L0)|F0,Z|L0)−H(F1(X|L1)|F1,Z|L1)
where (a) follows since both F0(X|L0) and F1(X |L1) are n(r− δ˜) bits each and (b) follows since F0(X|L0)−
F0,Z|L0 −K0,K1, U,Z, L0, L1, F1 and F1(X |L1) − F1,Z|L1 − F0(X|L0),K0,K1, U,Z, L0, L1, F0 are
Markov chains.
Now, R(X|L0 | Z|L0 = z|l0) = #e(z|l0). Also, whenever #e(z|l0) ≥ (ǫ2 − δ)|l0| = nr, then applying
Lemma 10, we get:
H(F0(X|L0) | F0,Z|L0 = z|l0) ≥ n(r − δ˜)−
2n(r−δ˜)−nr
ln 2
= n(r − δ˜)−
2−δ˜n
ln 2
We know from Chernoff’s bound that P [#e(Z|L0) ≥ (ǫ2− δ)|L0|] ≥ 1− ξ, where ξ −→ 0 exponentially fast
as n −→∞. Note that there is an implicit conditioning on the event Υ = 0 here too. Thus ,
I(K0,K1, U ;VE) ≤ I(U ;VE) + 2n(r − δ˜)−H(F0(X|L0) | F0,Z|L0)−H(F1(X |L1) | F1,Z|L1)
≤ I(U ;VE) + 2n(r − δ˜)− (1− ξ) · 2
(
n(r − δ˜)−
2−δ˜n
ln 2
)
September 8, 2018 DRAFT
38
= I(U ;VE) + 2ξn(r − δ˜) + 2(1− ξ)
2−δ˜n
ln 2
The first term above goes to 0 since (6) holds. Hence, I(K0,K1, U ;VE) −→ 0 as n −→∞.
C. Proof of Lemma 2
In this proof, we use a sequence (Pn)n∈N of Protocol 2 instances of rate (r − δ˜) and we show that (8) - (11)
are satisfied for (Pn)n∈N.
Let Υ be the event that Pn aborts in Step 2. Then, due to Chernoff’s bound, P [Υ = 1] −→ 0 exponentially fast
as n −→∞.
1) To show that (8) is satisfied for (Pn)n∈N, the proof is the same as that for showing that (4) holds for Protocol 1
and is, therefore, omitted.
2) To show that (9) is satisfied for (Pn)n∈N, it suffices to show (as in the proof of Lemma 1) that I(KU ;VB |Υ =
0) −→ 0 as n −→∞. The rest of this argument is implicitly conditioned on the event Υ = 0.
I(KU ;VB) = I(KU ;U,Y ,Λ)
= I(KU ;U,Y , L0, L1, F0, F1,K0 ⊕ F0(X |L0),K1 ⊕ F1(X|L1))
= I(KU ;U,Y , LU , LU , FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X|LU ),KU ⊕ FU (X |LU ))
(a)
= I(KU ;KU ⊕ FU (X |LU )|U,Y , LU , LU , FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X |LU ))
= H(KU ⊕ FU (X|LU )|U,Y , LU , LU , FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X|LU ))
−H(FU (X |LU )|KU , U,Y , LU , LU , FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X |LU ))
(b)
≤ n(r − δ˜)−H(FU (X|LU )|KU , U,Y , LU , LU , FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X|LU ))
(c)
= n(r − δ˜)−H(FU (X|LU )|FU ,Y |LU )
where (a) follows since KU ⊥ (U,Y , LU , LU , FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X |LU )), (b) follows since FU (X|LU ) is
n(r− δ˜) bits long and (c) follows since FU (X|LU )− FU ,Y |LU −KU , U,Y , LU , LU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X|LU )
is a Markov chain.
Now,
R(X|LU |Y |LU = y|lu) = #e(y|lu)
≥ nr
since the construction of LU contains at least nr positions that are erased for Bob. Applying Lemma 10, we
get:
H(FU (X |LU )|FU ,Y |LU = y|lu) ≥ n(r − δ˜)−
2n(r−δ˜)−nr
ln 2
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= n(r − δ˜)−
2−δ˜n
ln 2
As a result,
I(KU ;VB) ≤ n(r − δ˜)−H(FU (X|LU )|FU ,Y |LU )
≤
2−δ˜n
ln 2
Thus, I(KU ;VB) −→ 0 as n −→∞.
3) To show that (10) is satisfied for (Pn)n∈N, it suffices to show (as in the proof of Lemma 1) that I(U ;VA|Υ =
0) −→ 0 as n −→∞. The rest of this argument is implicitly conditioned on the event Υ = 0.
I(U ;VA) = I(U ;K0,K1,X,Λ)
= I(U ;K0,K1,X, L0, L1, F0, F1,K0 ⊕ F0(X|L0),K1 ⊕ F1(X|L1))
= I(U ;K0,K1,X, L0, L1, F0, F1, F0(X|L0), F1(X |L1))
= I(U ;K0,K1,X, L0, L1, F0, F1)
(a)
= I(U ;X, L0, L1)
(b)
= I(U ;L0, L1)
(c)
= 0
where (a) follows since K0,K1, F0, F1 ⊥ (U,X, L0, L1), (b) follows since X ⊥ (U,L0, L1) and (c) follows
since the channel acts independently on each input bit and |L0| = |L1| .
4) To show that (11) is satisfied for (Pn)n∈N, the proof is the same as that for showing (7) holds for Protocol 1.
D. Proof of Lemma 5
We need two lemmas from [2], which are stated here for completeness.
Lemma 11 ( [2]) Let A,B,C denote random variables with values in finite sets A, B and C respectively. Suppose
c1, c2 ∈ C with P [C = c1] = p > 0 and P [C = c2] = q > 0. Then,
|H(A|B,C = c1)−H(A|B,C = c2)| ≤ 3
√
(p+ q) ln 2
2pq
I(A,B;C)log|A|+ 1.
Lemma 12 ( [2], Lemma 2.2 of [1])
I(K0,K1;U,Y |X,Λ) = 0
Note that (10) and Lemma 11 together imply
H(K0|X,Λ, U = 0)−H(K0|X,Λ, U = 1) = o(n)
H(K1|X,Λ, U = 0)−H(K1|X,Λ, U = 1) = o(n)
September 8, 2018 DRAFT
40
Multiplying both equations by 1/2 and subtracting, we get
H(KU |X,Λ, U)−H(KU |X,Λ, U) = o(n). (22)
Lemma 12 implies that I(K0,K1;U |X,Λ) = 0. Hence,
H(K0,K1|X,Λ) = H(K0,K1|X ,Λ, U)
= H(KU ,KU |X,Λ, U)
= H(KU |X,Λ, U) +H(KU |X,Λ, U,KU )
≤ H(KU |X,Λ, U) +H(KU |X,Λ, U).
In light of (22), this lemma will be proved if we show either H(KU |X,Λ, U) or H(KU |X,Λ, U) to be o(n).
For this we note that Lemma 12 implies
I(K0,K1;Y |X,Λ, U) = 0.
This, in turn, implies that
I(KU ,KU ;Y |X,Λ, U) = 0.
Hence, I(KU ;Y |X,Λ, U) = 0. Therefore,
H(KU |X,Λ, U) = H(KU |X,Λ, U,Y )
(a)
= H(KU |X,Λ, U,Y , KˆU )
≤ H(KU |KˆU )
(b)
= o(n),
where (a) follows from the fact that KˆU is a function of (U,Y ,Λ), and (b) from (8) and Fano’s inequality.
APPENDIX D
OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER OVER A WIRETAPPED CHANNEL WITH MALICIOUS USERS : PROOF OF LEMMA 6
For this proof, the protocol sequence (Pn)n∈N we consider is a sequence of Protocol 3 instances when ǫ1 ≤ 1/2
and of Protocol 4 instances otherwise. The rate of each Protocol 3 instance is (ǫ1ǫ2− 5δ− 2δ˜− δ′) and the rate of
each Protocol 4 instance is (1 − ǫ1 − δ)(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ′). We show that (Pn)n∈N satisfies the conditions required
in the statement of Lemma 6.
A. Notation and definitions
• The definition of Ψ is given in (21).
• Let M be the matrix chosen by Alice and let Π be the corresponding bit sequence Bob sends to Alice during
interactive hashing.
September 8, 2018 DRAFT
41
• Let the view of Eve, just before Alice sends the encrypted strings and hash functions, be VE . Then,
VE =


(Z ,L0,L1,M ,Π,Θ,Y |L0|J
Θ
,Y |L1|JΘ ), ǫ1 ≤
1
2
(Z ,M ,Π,Θ,Y |L0∩L1), ǫ1 >
1
2
• Let the combined views of Bob and Eve, just before Alice sends the encrypted strings and hash functions, be
VBE . Then,
VBE =


(U,Y ,Z,L0,L1,S,M), ǫ1 ≤
1
2 ,Bob honest
(Y ,Z,L0,L1,M ,Π,Θ), ǫ1 ≤
1
2 ,Bob malicious
(U,Y ,Z,S,M), ǫ1 >
1
2 ,Bob honest
(Y ,Z,M ,Π,Θ), ǫ1 >
1
2 ,Bob malicious
Note that if the output of interactive hashing corresponding to the input string S are the strings S0,S1, then
S0,S1 are functions of S,M as well as functions of M ,Π.
B. Proof of Lemma 6(a)
1) Pn aborts with vanishing probability:
ǫ1 ≤ 1/2:
The protocol can abort at steps (2), (4) or (7). We show that when Alice and Bob are honest, each of these aborts
happens only with vanishing probability.
• In step (2), we note that β + γ = 1− ǫ1 − δ − δ˜. As a consequence of Chernoff’s bound, #e(Y ) ≥ (β + γ)n
w.h.p.. Similarly, since β − γ = ǫ1 − δ, then w.h.p., #e(Y ) ≥ (β − γ)n. Thus, an abort happens in this step
with only vanishing probability.
• In step (4), an abort never happens since {L0}, {L1} are disjoint by construction.
• In step (7), we note that the strings Y |L0|J
Θ
, Y |L1|JΘ are, in fact, the strings Y |LU |JΦ , Y |LU |JΦ . By
construction, #e(Y |LU |J
Φ
) = 0 and #e(Y |LU |JΦ ) = 0. So, Bob correctly reveals the bits X|LU |JΦ and
X|LU |JΦ . Hence, an abort never happens in this step since Alice’s check in this step always passes.
ǫ1 > 1/2:
The protocol can abort at steps (2), (5), (6) or (8). We show that when Alice and Bob are honest, each of these
aborts happens only with vanishing probability.
• In step (2), we note that β = 1 − ǫ1 − δ. As a consequence of Chernoff’s bound, #e(Y ) ≥ βn w.h.p. Thus,
an abort happens in this step with only vanishing probability.
• In step (5), an abort happens when either S ∈ Bc or SΦ ∈ Bc. Now, P [S ∈ Bc] = 1 − |B|/2m. As a
consequence of Lemma 15 (in Appendix D-E), the fractional part of log |B| = log |T | = log(nCβn) converges
to 1 over an appropriate choice of a sequence of natural numbers. As a result, 1 − |B|/2m can be made
as small as desired by choosing a sufficiently large n from this sequence. Similarly, due to Property 3 of
interactive hashing, the string SΦ is uniformly distributed over all strings other than S. As a result, P [SΦ ∈
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Bc] = |Bc|/(2m − 1) = (2m − |B|)/(2m− 1) which can be made arbitrarily small, again as a consequence of
Lemma 15.
• To see that the protocol aborts in step (6) only with vanishing probability, we begin by noting that when
Alice and Bob are honest, interactive hashing guarantees that SΦ ∼ Unif{s ∈ {0, 1}m : s 6= S}. Since the
protocol did not abort in step (5), this implies that SΦ ∼ Unif{s ∈ B : s 6= S}. Since Q is a bijective
map, LΦ is uniform over T \{LΦ}. Let lφ be a specific realization of LΦ. Lemma 19 (in Appendix D-E,
applied with k = n, ϕ = β, ρ = δ, υ0 = lφ,Υ1 = LΦ) proves that the probability with which the overlap size
|LΦ ∩ LΦ| = |L0 ∩ L1| is outside the specified bounds falls exponentially in n.
• The protocol never aborts in step (8) when users are honest. This is because #e(Y |LΦ) = 0. Since L0∩L1 =
LΦ ∩LΦ ⊂ LΦ, Y |L0∩L1 =X|L0∩L1 . Hence, Alice’s check in step (8) always passes when users are honest.
2) (4)-(7) hold:
The rate rn of Protocol Pn is:
rn =


ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ′, ǫ1 ≤
1
2
(1− ǫ1 − δ)(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ′), ǫ1 >
1
2
To show that (4)-(7) hold over (Pn)n∈N, we first note that when Alice and Bob are honest, all the checks in Pn
pass with high probability (as proved above). Thus, these checks cease to matter when Alice and Bob are honest.
In such a setting, we show that Pn then is fundamentally no different from Protocol 1 which satisfies (4)-(7) for
honest Bob and Alice in this setup.
ǫ1 ≤ 1/2:
In this case of the protocol, Bob sends disjoint tuples L0,L1 to Alice over the public channel. One of these
tuples comprises of unerased positions and the other comprises of mostly erased positions from Y . Alice uses the
bits X|L0 ,X|L1 to form keys (using functions F0, F1) that she uses to encrypt her strings K0,K1. We show that
both keys are secret from Eve (even if Eve additionally know U ) and there is one key not known to colluding
Bob and Eve. The steps involved in proving these statements are not very different from those proving a similar
property for Protocol 1, except that VE , VBE here have some additional variables in them including the ones used
during interactive hashing.
• We show in Lemma 23 (in Appendix D-E) that
H(F0(X |L0) | F0, U, VE) ≥ (1− ξ) ·
(
(ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ
′)n−
2−(δ+δ
′)n
ln 2
)
H(F1(X |L1) | F1, U, VE) ≥ (1− ξ) ·
(
(ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ
′)n−
2−(δ+δ
′)n
ln 2
)
where ξ −→ 0 exponentially fast as n −→∞.
Thus, even if Eve knows U , Eve gains only about 2−(δ+δ′)n/ ln 2 bits of information about either of the keys
that encrypt K0 and K1.
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• We show in Lemma 21 (in Appendix D-E) that
H(FU (X|LU ) | FU , VBE) ≥ (1− ξ) ·
(
(ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ
′)n−
2−(δ+δ
′)n
ln 2
)
where ξ −→ 0 exponentially fast as n −→∞.
Thus, colluding Bob and Eve learn only about 2−(δ+δ′)n/ ln 2 bits of information about the key FU (X|LU ).
Hence, both keys are secret from Eve and one of the keys is secret from colluding Bob and Eve. Such keys
encrypting Alice’s strings are sufficient to satisfy (4)-(7) in this setup, as seen previously in Protocol 1. As a result,
(4)-(7) are satisfied for (Pn)n∈N as well.
ǫ1 > 1/2:
This case of the protocol is the same as that described for ǫ1 ≤ 1/2, except that the disjoint tuples being used are
now (L0\L0 ∩L1) and (L1\L0 ∩L1). We again show that both keys are secret from Eve (even if Eve additionally
knows U ) and there is one key not known to colluding Bob and Eve.
• By Lemma 24 (in Appendix D-E), we have
H(FU (X|LΦ\L0∩L1) | FU , U, VE) ≥ (1− ξ) ·
(
βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ
′)−
2−(δ+δ
′)βn
ln 2
)
H(FU (X|LΦ\L0∩L1) | FU , U, VE) ≥ (1− ξ) ·
(
βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ
′)−
2−(δ+δ
′)βn
ln 2
)
where ξ −→ 0 exponentially fast as n −→∞.
Thus, even if Eve knows U , Eve gains only about 2−(δ+δ′)βn/ ln 2 bit of information about either of the keys
that encrypt K0 and K1.
• We show in Lemma 22 (in Appendix D-E) that
H(FU (X|LΦ\L0∩L1) | FU , VBE) ≥ (1− ξ) ·
(
βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ
′)−
2−(δ+δ
′)βn
ln 2
)
where ξ −→ 0 exponentially fast as n −→∞.
Thus, colluding Bob and Eve learn only about 2−(δ+δ′)βn/ ln 2 bits of information about the key FU (X|LΦ\L0∩L1).
This scheme, like Protocol 1, produces two keys both of which are not known to Eve and one of which is not
known to colluding Bob and Eve. Thus, for the same reasons as for Protocol 1, (4)-(7) are satisfied for (Pn)n∈N.
C. Proof of Lemma 6(b)
A malicious Alice, colluding with Eve, can present arbitrary values for X and can adopt an arbitrary strategy
during interactive hashing, in Pn. Let VAE be the combined views of Alice and Eve at the start of interactive
hashing and let V IHAE be the combined views of Alice and Eve at the end of interactive hashing. Then, Prop-
erty 4 of interactive hashing guarantees that if, ∀s ∈ {0, 1}m, P [S = s|VAE ] = 1/2m, then ∀s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}m,
P
[
S = s0|V IHAE ,S0 = s0,S1 = s1
]
= P
[
S = s1|V IHAE ,S0 = s0,S1 = s1
]
= 1/2. In other words,
P
[
Φ = 0|V IHAE ,S0 = s0,S1 = s1
]
= P
[
Φ = 1|V IHAE ,S0 = s0,S1 = s1
]
= 1/2.
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This is the main property that we use to guarantee privacy for honest Bob against malicious Alice who is potentially
colluding with Eve. Specifically, we show that malicious Alice cannot influence or guess honest Bob’s choices and,
as a result, does not learn U .
1) ǫ1 ≤ 1/2:
In this regime, (X ,Z,K0,K1)− (E,E,S,J)− (L0,L1) is a Markov chain. Furthermore,
• (E,E,S,J) ⊥ (X,Z,K0,K1)
• (S,J) ⊥ (E,E), since honest Bob chose the string S independently of E,E.
• (L0,L1) ⊥ (S,J), since L0,L1 are randomly ordered tuples, conveying no information about S,J .
Thus, when malicious Alice receives L0,L1, it gains no information about S,J and certainly no information
about U .
Now, VAE = (X,Z,K0,K1,L0,L1). Hence,
P [S = s|VAE ] = P [S = s|X,Z,K0,K1,L0,L1]
= P [S = s|X,Z,K0,K1]
= P [S = s]
=
1
2m
As a result, P
[
Φ = 0|V IHAE
]
= P
[
Φ = 1|V IHAE
]
= 1/2. Thus, when Bob communicates Θ = Φ⊕ U , malicious
Alice does not learn U .
2) ǫ1 > 1/2:
In this regime, (X ,Z,K0,K1) − (E,E) − S is a Markov chain. Since (E,E) ⊥ (X ,Z,K0,K1), we have
S ⊥ (X,Z,K0,K1). Importantly, VAE = (X,Z,K0,K1) and, thus, S ⊥ VAE . As a result,
P [S = s|VAE ] = P [S = s] =


∑
bg
P [S = s| |BG| = bg] · P [|BG| = bg], s ∈ B
1
|Bc| ·
(
1− |B|2m
)
, s ∈ Bc
=


∑
bg
P [S = s|s ∈ BG, |BG| = bg]
·P [s ∈ BG| |BG| = bg] · P [|BG| = bg], s ∈ B
1
2m , s ∈ B
c
Note that :
• P [S = s|s ∈ BG, |BG| = bg] =
1
bg
· |B|2m
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• P [s ∈ BG| |BG| = bg] = 1− P [s /∈ BG| |BG| = bg]
= 1−
|B|−1Cbg
|B|Cbg
= 1−
|B| − bg
|B|
=
bg
|B|
Thus,
P [S = s|VAE ] =


∑
bg
1
bg
|B|
2m ·
bg
|B| · P [|BG| = bg], s ∈ B
1
2m , s ∈ B
c
=


1
2m , s ∈ B
1
2m , s ∈ B
c
That is, ∀s ∈ {0, 1}m, P [S = s|VAE ] = P [S = s] = 1/2m. As a result, P
[
Φ = 0|V IHAE
]
= P
[
Φ = 1|V IHAE
]
=
1/2. Hence, when Alice receives Θ = Φ⊕ U , Alice learns nothing about U .
D. Proof of Lemma 6(c)
1) ǫ1 ≤ 1/2:
A malicious Bob, in collusion with Eve, can produce arbitrary values for (L0,L1,Θ) during Pn. In order to
pass the check in step 4, {L0}, {L1} have to be disjoint. Importantly, Bob has to reveal L0,L1 before it initiates
interactive hashing.
We consider the following two exhaustive cases on #e(Ψ|L0),#e(Ψ|L1) (see (21) for the definition of Ψ).
Case 1: (#e(Ψ|L0) < δn) OR (#e(Ψ|L1) < δn)
W.l.o.g. let #e(Ψ|L0) < δn. A lower bound on #e(Ψ|L1) is computed as follows :
#e(Ψ|L1) ≤ #e(Ψ)−#e(Ψ|L0)
≤ (1− ǫ1ǫ2 + δ)n−#e(Ψ|L0) [due to Chernoff’s bound, w.h.p.]
≤ (1− ǫ1ǫ2 + δ)n− (βn− δn)
Therefore,
#e(Ψ|L1) = βn−#e(Ψ|L1)
≥ βn− (1− ǫ1ǫ2 + δ)n+ (βn− δn)
= 2βn− (1− ǫ1ǫ2 + 2δ)n
= 2
(
1
2
− δ − δ˜
)
n− (1− ǫ1ǫ2 + 2δ)n
= (ǫ1ǫ2 − 4δ − 2δ˜)n
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We show in Lemma 25 (in Appendix D-E) that whenever #e(Ψ|L1) ≥ (ǫ1ǫ2 − 4δ − 2δ˜)n,
R(X|L1 | VBE = vBE) ≥ (ǫ1ǫ2 − 4δ − 2δ˜)n.
As a consequence of Lemma 10, we get:
H(F1(X|L1) | F1, VBE = vBE) ≥ (ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ
′)n−
2(ǫ1ǫ2−5δ−2δ˜−δ
′)n−(ǫ1ǫ2−4δ−2δ˜)n
ln 2
= (ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ
′)n−
2−(δ+δ
′)n
ln 2
.
That is, colluding Bob and Eve learn no more than 2−(δ+δ′)n/ ln 2 bits of information about F1(X|L1). Hence,
malicious Bob colluding with Eve learns only a vanishingly small amount of information about K1 from K1 ⊕
F1(X|L1).
Case 2 : (#e(Ψ|L0) ≥ δn) AND (#e(Ψ|L1) ≥ δn)
The key idea in this part of the proof is the following: Bob cannot control the tuple JΦ produced by interactive
hashing. However, Bob has to correctly reveal to Alice either XL0|J
Φ
or XL1|J
Φ
(depending on Θ). We show that
both ΨL0|J
Φ
and ΨL1|J
Φ
have a substantial number of erasures and Bob can reveal these erased bits correctly
with only exponentially small probability.
Define
Te :=
{
a ∈ T : #e(Ψ|L0|a) < γδn OR #e(Ψ|L1|a) < γδn
}
Let ψ|l0 ,ψ|l1 be specific realizations of Ψ|L0 ,Ψ|L1 respectively. Applying Lemma 17 (with p = ψ|l0 ,q =
ψ|l1 , k = βn, ϕ = δ/β, α = γ/β, ρ = δ), we get:
|Te|
|T |
≤ 2e−2γnδ
2
Now, let Be = Q−1(Te). Then we have:
|Be|
2m
≤
|Be|
|T |
≤
2|Te|
|T |
≤ 4e−2γnδ
2
Property 5 of interactive hashing now gives:
P [S0,S1 ∈ Be] ≤ 16×
|Be|
2m
≤ 64× e−2γnδ
2
Thus, with high probability either S0 /∈ Be or S1 /∈ Be. Let us assume that S0 /∈ Be. Recall that J0 = Q(S0).
Therefore, J0 /∈ Te. This means #e(Ψ|L0|J0 ) ≥ γδn and #e(Ψ|L1|J0 ) ≥ γδn. Since Bob has to reveal one of
these bit strings correctly to Alice, Bob has to guess at least γδn unknown i.i.d. bits correctly. Bob can make the
correct guess with probability 2−γδn. A similar argument holds if we assume S1 /∈ Be. Hence, Bob fails the test
in step 7 with very high probability.
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2) ǫ1 > 1/2:
In this case, malicious Bob in collusion with Eve, can present an arbitrary value for Θ during Pn. Bob initiates
interactive hashing and gets the output strings S0,S1. Recall that L0 = Q(S0) and L1 = Q(S1). We show that
it is only with negligibly small probability that both #e(Ψ|L0) and #e(Ψ|L1) exceed a certain threshold. That is,
with high probability, at least one of #e(Ψ|L0) or #e(Ψ|L1) is below that threshold.
We condition the following arguments on no abort happening in step 5, which means that S0,S1 ∈ B.
Define
Te := {A ∈ T : #e(Ψ|A) ≥ βn(1− ǫ1ǫ2 + 2δ)}
Note that w.h.p. (due to Chernoff’s bound), #e(Ψ) ≤ (1 − ǫ1ǫ2 + δ)n. Let ψ be a typical realization of Ψ.
Applying Lemma 16 (with p = ψ, k = n, 1− ϕ = (1− ǫ1ǫ2 + δ), α = β, ρ = δ), we have w.h.p.:
|Te|
|T |
≤ e−2βnδ
2
Now, let Be = Q−1(Te). Then we have:
|Be|
|B|
=
|Te|
|B|
=
|Te|
|T |
≤ e−2βnδ
2
Property 5 of interactive hashing now gives:
P [S0,S1 ∈ Be] ≤ 16×
|Be|
B
≤ 16× e−2βnδ
2
This implies that w.h.p. either S0 /∈ Be or S1 /∈ Be. That is, w.h.p. either L0 /∈ Te or L1 /∈ Te. As a result,
w.h.p. either #e(Ψ|L0) < βn(1− ǫ1ǫ2 + 2δ) or #e(Ψ|L1) < βn(1− ǫ1ǫ2 + 2δ).
Since the protocol uses X|L0\L0∩L1 and X|L1\L0∩L1 for creating the keys (using the hash functions F0, F1),
the keys obtained are independent. To ensure that at least one of these keys remains unknown to malicious Bob,
the protocol has the following two steps:
1) In step 7, Bob has to correctly reveal X|L0∩L1 . Asking Bob to reveal X|L0∩L1 prevents malicious Bob
from manipulating interactive hashing to have Ψ|L0∩L1 comprise of erasures, thereby packing Ψ|L0\L0∩L1
with non-erasures of of Ψ|L0 and packing Ψ|L1\L0∩L1 with non-erasures of Ψ|L1 . Such a packing would
allow malicious Bob to learn non-negligible information about the keys being created using X|L0\L0∩L1 and
X|L1\L0∩L1 . As a result,
#e(Ψ|L0\L0∩L1) = #e(Ψ|L0)− |L0 ∩ L1|
#e(Ψ|L1\L0∩L1) = #e(Ψ|L1)− |L0 ∩ L1|
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2) We know that after the previous step,
#e(Ψ|L0\L0∩L1) = |L0\L0 ∩ L1| −#e(Ψ|L0\L0∩L1)
= βn− |L0 ∩ L1| −#e(Ψ|L0\L0∩L1)
= βn−#e(Ψ|L0)
and
#e(Ψ|L1\L0∩L1) = |L1\L0 ∩ L1| −#e(Ψ|L1\L0∩L1)
= βn− |L0 ∩ L1| −#e(Ψ|L1\L0∩L1)
= βn−#e(Ψ|L1)
Thus, w.h.p. either #e(Ψ|L0\L0∩L1) ≥ βn(ǫ1ǫ2− 2δ) or #e(Ψ|L1\L0∩L1) ≥ βn(ǫ1ǫ2− 2δ). W.l.o.g. suppose
#e(Ψ|L0\L0∩L1) ≥ βn(ǫ1ǫ2−2δ). We show in Lemma 26 (in Appendix D-E) that whenever #e(Ψ|L0\L0∩L1) ≥
βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 2δ), we have
R(X|L0\L0∩L1 |VBE = vBE) ≥ βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 2δ).
Furthermore, suppose that X|L0\L0∩L1 is the input to F1. Then, applying Lemma 10 gives us:
H(F1(X|L0\L0∩L1)|F1, VBE = vBE) ≥ βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ
′)−
2βn(ǫ1ǫ2−3δ−δ
′)−βn(ǫ1ǫ2−2δ)
ln 2
= βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ
′)−
2−(δ+δ
′)βn
ln 2
This shows that malicious Bob, in collusion with Eve, cannot learn more than 2−(δ+δ′)βn/ ln 2 bits of information
for at least one of the keys created using F0, F1. That is, for at least one of strings K0,K1, colluding Bob and
Eve gain only a vanishingly small amount of information, regardless of what value of Θ Bob chooses to reveal
during Pn.
E. Supporting Lemmas
Lemma 13 (Hoeffding’s Inequality, [16, Proposition 1.2]) Let A = (a1, a2, . . . , aN ) be a finite population of N
points and A1, A2, . . . , Ak be a random sample drawn without replacement from A. Let
a = min
1≤i≤N
ai and a˜ = max
1≤i≤N
ai
Then, for all ρ > 0,
P
[
1
k
k∑
i=1
Ai − µ ≥ ρ
]
≤ e
− 2kρ
2
(a˜−a)2
where µ = (1/N) ·
N∑
i=1
ai is the mean of A.
Lemma 14 Let ϑ ∈ Q ∩ [0,∞), α ∈ R\Q ∩ [0,∞) and ϕ ∈ R ∩ [0,∞) be constants. Then, (< nα − ϕ logn >
){n∈N:ϑn∈N} is dense in [0, 1].
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Proof: We prove the claim in three parts:
1) We show that (< nα >)n∈N is dense in [0, 1].
2) Using the fact that logn increases very slowly at large values of n, we show that (< nα− ϕ logn >)n∈N is
dense in [0, 1].
3) Finally, we show that the statements above hold even with the restriction that ϑn should be an integer, i.e. we
show that (< nα− ϕ logn >){n∈N:ϑn∈N} is dense in [0, 1].
Proof of 1): We first note that the sequence (< nα >)n∈N comprises of distinct numbers. If not and suppose
< n1α > = < n2α >, n2 > n1, then:
n2α− n1α = (⌊n2α⌋+ < n2α >)− (⌊n1α⌋+ < n1α >)
= ⌊n2α⌋ − ⌊n1α⌋
which implies
α =
⌊n2α⌋ − ⌊n1α⌋
n2 − n1
which is clearly a contradiction since α is irrational.
Then, we note that for any γ > 0, ∃k1, k2 ∈ N, k2 > k1, such that
| < k2α > − < k1α > | ≤ γ
If not, then the sequence (< nα >)n∈N cannot be an infinite sequence of distinct elements, again a contradiction.
Let K = k2 − k1 and | < k2α > − < k1α > | = γ˜ ≤ γ. Consider the sequence (< jKα >)⌊1/γ˜⌋j=1 . This is the
sequence (jγ˜)⌊1/γ˜⌋j=1 if < k2α > > < k1α > or the sequence (1− jγ˜)
⌊1/γ˜⌋
j=1 if < k2α > < < k1α >.
Thus, for any x ∈ [0, 1], ∃j0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ⌊1/γ˜⌋} such that x ∈ Nγ˜(< j0Kα >). Clearly then, x ∈ Nγ(<
j0Kα >). Since γ was chosen arbitrarily, the sequence (< jKα >)⌊1/γ˜⌋j=1 is dense in [0, 1]. This, in turn, implies
that (< nα >)n∈N is dense in [0, 1].
Proof of 2): Let M ∈ N such that:
ϕ log(M + ⌊
1
γ˜
⌋K)− ϕ logM < γ
and
Mα− ϕ logM > 0. (23)
For example, consider any M > ϕ · ⌊1/γ˜⌋K/γ ln 2 for which (23) holds. Clearly, the sequence (< (M+jK)α >
)
⌊1/γ˜⌋
j=1 still approximates any number in [0, 1] to within a precision of γ. As a result, the elements of the sequence
(< (M + jK)α− ϕ log(M + jK) >)
⌊1/γ˜⌋
j=1 approximate any element of [0, 1] to within a precision of 2γ. Again,
since γ was arbitrary, (< (M + jK)α − ϕ log(M + jK) >)⌊1/γ˜⌋j=1 is dense in [0, 1]. As a result, the sequence
(< nα− ϕ logn >)n∈N is dense in [0, 1].
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Proof of 3): Let ϑ = p/q. We show that the reasoning developed so far holds even when all the integers, sequences
and offsets considered are multiplied by q. For clarity, we repeat the previous arguments with this change included
in them.
We first note that the sequence (< qnα >)n∈N comprises of distinct numbers. If not and, say, < qn1α > = <
qn2α >, n2 > n1, then:
qn2α− qn1α = (⌊qn2α⌋+ < qn2α >)− (⌊qn1α⌋+ < qn1α >)
= ⌊qn2α⌋ − ⌊qn1α⌋
which implies
α =
⌊qn2α⌋ − ⌊qn1α⌋
qn2 − qn1
which is clearly a contradiction since α is irrational.
Then, we note that for any γ > 0, ∃k1, k2 ∈ N, k2 > k1, such that
| < qk2α > − < qk1α > | ≤ γ
If not, then the sequence (< qnα >)n∈N cannot be an infinite sequence of distinct elements, again a contradiction.
Let K = qk2 − qk1 and | < qk2α > − < qk1α > | = γ˜ ≤ γ. Consider the sequence (< jKα >)⌊1/γ˜⌋j=1 . This is
the sequence (jγ˜)⌊1/γ˜⌋j=1 if < qk2α > > < qk1α > or the sequence (1− jγ˜)
⌊1/γ˜⌋
j=1 if < qk2α > < < qk1α >.
Thus, for any x ∈ [0, 1], ∃j0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ⌊1/γ˜⌋} such that x ∈ Nγ˜(< j0Kα >). Clearly then, x ∈ Nγ(<
j0Kα >). Since γ was chosen arbitrarily, the sequence (< jKα >)⌊1/γ˜⌋j=1 is dense in [0, 1]. Importantly, ϑjK =
pj(k2 − k1) ∈ N This now implies that (< nα >){n∈N:ϑn∈N} is dense in [0, 1].
Now consider the offset M ∈ N such that:
ϕ log(qM + ⌊
1
γ˜
⌋K)− ϕ log(qM) < γ
and
qMα− ϕ log(qM) > 0. (24)
For example, consider any M > (1/q) · (ϕ⌊1/γ˜⌋K/γ ln 2) for which (24) holds. Clearly, the sequence (<
(qM+jK)α >)
⌊1/γ˜⌋
j=1 still approximates any number in [0, 1] to within a precision of γ. As a result, the elements of
the sequence (< (qM + jK)α−ϕ log(qM + jK) >)⌊1/γ˜⌋j=1 approximate any element of [0, 1] to within a precision
of 2γ. Again, since γ was arbitrary, (< (qM + jK)α − ϕ log(qM + jK) >)⌊1/γ˜⌋j=1 is dense in [0, 1]. Importantly
again, ϑ(qM + jK) = p(M + j(k2 − k1)) ∈ N. As a result, the sequence (< nα− ϕ logn >){n∈N:ϑn∈N} is dense
in [0, 1].
Lemma 15 For H(β) ∈ R\Q ∩ [0,∞), the sequence (< log(nCβn) >){n∈N:βn∈N} is dense in [0, 1].
Proof: By Sterling’s approximation,
log(nCβn) = nH(β)−
1
2
log(2πβ(1− β)n) − log(1 +O(
1
n
))
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= nH(β)−
1
2
logn−
1
2
log(2πβ(1 − β))− log(1 +O(
1
n
))
By Lemma 14, the sequence (< nH(β)−(1/2) logn >){n∈N:βn∈N} is dense in [0, 1]. Since (1/2)·log(2πβ(1−β))
is a constant, the sequence (< nH(β)− (1/2) logn− (1/2) log(2πβ(1− β)) >){n∈N:βn∈N} is also dense in [0, 1].
The claim now follows since for large n, the term log(1 +O(1/n)) is negligibly small.
Lemma 16 Let p ∈ {0, 1,⊥}k be fixed. Let ϕ ∈ (0, 1] be such that #e(p) ≥ ϕk. Let ϕ = 1 − ϕ, ρ > 0 and
α ∈ [0, 1]. Define Tα := {A ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , k} : |A| = αk}, Te := {A ∈ Tα : #e(p|A) ≤ αk(ϕ − ρ)} and
Te := {A ∈ Tα : #e(p|A) ≥ αk(ϕ+ ρ)}. Then,
|Te|
|Tα|
=
|Te|
|Tα|
≤ e−2αkρ
2
Proof: Let υ := {j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} : pj = ⊥} and let Υ ∼ Unif(Tα). Then, #e(p|Υ) = |υ ∩Υ|.
Let
ω :=

ωj ∈ {0, 1}, j = 1, 2, . . . , k : ωj = 0, pj = ⊥
ωj = 1, pj 6= ⊥


Let µ = 1− (1/k) ·
k∑
j=0
ωj . Note that µ ≥ ϕ.
Let Ωi, i = 1, 2, . . . , αk be random samples drawn from ω without replacement. Clearly then, #e(p|Υ) =
|υ ∩Υ| ∼ αk −
αk∑
i=1
Ωi.
Using Lemma 13, we get:
P
[
1
αk
αk∑
i=1
Ωi ≥ (1 − µ) + ρ
]
≤ e−2αkρ
2
This implies:
P
[
1
αk
|υ ∩Υ| ≤ µ− ρ
]
≤ e−2αkρ
2
Since µ ≥ ϕ, we get:
P [|υ ∩Υ| ≤ αk(ϕ − ρ)] ≤ e−2αkρ
2
Since Υ was a random choice from Tα, it follows that :
|Te|
|Tα|
≤ e−2αkρ
2
Furthermore, for A ∈ Tα, #e(p|A) = αk −#e(p|A). As a result, Te = Te and the result follows.
Lemma 17 Let p,q ∈ {0, 1,⊥}k be fixed. Let ϕ > 0 be such that #e(p) ≥ ϕk and #e(q) ≥ ϕk. Let ρ > 0
and α ∈ [0, 1]. Define Tα := {A ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , k} : |A| = αk} and Te := {A ∈ Tα : #e(p|A) < αk(ϕ −
ρ) OR #e(q|A) < αk(ϕ− ρ)}. Then,
|Te|
|Tα|
≤ 2e−2αkρ
2
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Proof:
|Te| ≤ |{A ∈ Tα : #e(p|A) < αk(ϕ − ρ)}|
+ |{A ∈ Tα : #e(q|A) < αk(ϕ− ρ)}|
≤ e−2αkρ
2
· |Tα|+ e
−2αkρ2 · |Tα| [using Lemma 16]
As a result,
|Te|
|Tα|
≤ 2e−2αkρ
2
Lemma 18 Let ϕ, α ∈ (0, 1], ρ > 0. Let Tϕ := {A ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , k} : |A| = ϕk} and Tα := {A ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , k} :
|A| = αk}. Let υ ∈ Tϕ,Υ ∼ Unif(Tα).
Then,
P
[∣∣∣∣ 1αk |υ ∩Υ| − ϕ
∣∣∣∣ > ρ
]
≤ 2e−2αkρ
2
Proof: Let
ω :=

ωi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2, . . . , k : ωi = 1, i ∈ υ
ωi = 0, i /∈ υ


Let Ωj , j = 1, 2, . . . , αk be random samples drawn from ω without replacement. Clearly then,
αk∑
j=1
Ωj ∼ |υ ∩Υ|.
Applying Lemma 13, we have:
P

 1
αk
αk∑
j=1
Ωj − ϕ ≥ ρ

 ≤ e−2αkρ2
If, in ω, we now change all 1’s to 0’s and vice-versa and proceed as above, we get:
P

 1
αk
αk∑
j=1
Ωj − ϕ ≤ −ρ

 ≤ e−2αkρ2
Combining these two inequalities using the union bound, we get:
P
[∣∣∣∣ 1αk |υ ∩Υ| − ϕ
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ρ
]
≤ 2e−2αkρ
2
Lemma 19 Let ϕ ∈ (0, 1], ρ > 0. Let Tϕ := {A ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , k} : |A| = ϕk}, υ ∈ Tϕ,Υ ∼ Unif(Tϕ\{υ}).
Then,
P
[∣∣∣∣ 1ϕk |υ ∩Υ| − ϕ
∣∣∣∣ > ρ
]
≤
2e−2ϕkρ
2
1− 1|Tϕ|
Proof: Using Lemma 18,∣∣∣∣
{
A ∈ Tϕ :
∣∣∣∣ 1ϕk |υ ∩ A| − ϕ
∣∣∣∣ > ρ
}∣∣∣∣ ≤ |Tϕ| · 2e−2ϕkρ2
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So, ∣∣∣∣
{
A ∈ Tϕ\{υ} :
∣∣∣∣ 1ϕk |υ ∩ A| − ϕ
∣∣∣∣ > ρ
}∣∣∣∣ ≤ |Tϕ| · 2e−2ϕkρ2
The result now follows, considering that Υ is uniform over |Tϕ| − 1 possibilities.
Lemma 20 Let α0 ∈ (0, 1]. Then, ∃(αn)n∈N such that ∀n ∈ N, αn ∈ [0, α0) ∩ Q, αn −→ α0 as n −→ ∞ and
H(αn) ∈ R\Q.
Proof:
For any n ∈ N, let kn ∈ N be such that 1/3kn < 1/n. Then, it is easy to check that ∃an ∈ N such that
α0 − 1/n < an/3
kn < α0. Let αn = an/3kn , n ∈ N such that α0 − 1/n < αn < α0. Clearly, αn ∈ [0, α0) ∩ Q
and αn −→ α0 as n −→∞. Also,
−H(αn) = −H
( an
3kn
)
=
an
3kn
log
( an
3kn
)
+
(
1−
an
3kn
)
log
(
1−
an
3kn
)
= log

( an
3kn
) an
3kn
·
(
3kn − an
3kn
) 3kn−an
3kn


=
1
3kn
log

( an
3kn
)an
·
(
3kn − an
3kn
)3kn−an
=
1
3kn
log
(
bn
3jn
)
where bn, jn ∈ N. Thus,
H(αn) =
1
3kn
log
(
3jn
bn
)
Suppose that log
(
3jn/bn
)
is rational. That is, ∃p, q ∈ N, q 6= 0 such that :
log
(
3jn
bn
)
=
p
q
This implies that 2
p
q = 3jn/bn. That is, 2p = 3qjn/bqn. Hence,
bqn =
3qjn
2p
This is a contradiction since the RHS cannot be an integer, as its numerator is an odd number while the
denominator is an even number. Thus, log
(
3jn/bn
)
is irrational. As a result, H(αn) = (1/3kn) · log
(
3jn/bn
)
is also irrational.
Lemma 21 Suppose ǫ1 ≤ 1/2 and Bob is honest. Then,
H(FU (X|LU )|FU , VBE) ≥ (1 − ξ) ·
(
(ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ
′)n−
2−(δ+δ
′)n
ln 2
)
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where ξ −→ 0 exponentially fast as n −→∞.
Proof: Suppose vBE = (u,y, z, l0, l1, s,m). Then,
R(X|LU |VBE = vBE) = R(X|lU |u,y, z, l0, l1, s,m)
= R(X|lU |u,y, z, lu, lu, s,m)
(a)
= R(X|lU |u,y, z, lu)
= R(X|lU |u,y, z, lu,ψ|lu)
(b)
= R(X|lU |ψ|lu)
= #e(ψ|lu)
where (a) follows since X|LU − U,X,Y ,LU − LU ,S,M is a Markov chain and (b) follows since X|LU −
Ψ|LU − U,Y ,Z,LU is a Markov chain.
Whenever #e(ψ|lu) ≥ (ǫ2 − δ)(βn− γn) = (ǫ2 − δ)(ǫ1 − δ)n, then by applying Lemma 10 we get:
H(FU (X |LU )|FU , VBE = vBE) ≥ (ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ
′)n−
2(ǫ1ǫ2−5δ−2δ˜−δ
′−(ǫ2−δ)(ǫ1−δ))n
ln 2
≥ (ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ
′)n−
2−(δ+δ
′)n
ln 2
Also, by Chernoff’s bound P [#e(Ψ|LU ) ≥ (ǫ2 − δ)(βn − γn)] ≥ 1 − ξ, where ξ −→ 0 exponentially fast as
n −→∞. Thus, we have
H(FU (X|LU )|FU , VBE) ≥ (1 − ξ) ·
(
(ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ
′)n−
2−(δ+δ
′)n
ln 2
)
Lemma 22 Suppose ǫ1 > 1/2 and Bob is honest. Then,
H(FU (X|LΦ\L0∩L1)|FU , VBE) ≥ (1− ξ) ·
(
βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ
′)−
2−(δ+δ
′)βn
ln 2
)
where ξ −→ 0 exponentially fast as n −→∞.
Proof: Suppose vBE = (u,y, z, s,m). Then,
R(X|LΦ\L0∩L1|VBE = vBE) = R(X|lΦ\l0∩l1 |u,y, z, s,m)
(a)
= R(X|lΦ\l0∩l1 |u,y, z, s,m, lΦ\l0 ∩ l1)
(b)
= R(X|lΦ\l0∩l1 |y, z, lΦ\l0 ∩ l1)
= R(X|lΦ\l0∩l1 |y, z, lΦ\l0 ∩ l1,ψ|Lφ\l0∩l1)
(c)
= R(X|lΦ\l0∩l1 |ψ|lφ\l0∩l1)
= #e(ψ|lφ\l0∩l1)
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where (a) follows since L0, L1,Φ are functions of (S,M), (b) follows since X|LΦ\L0∩L1−Y ,Z, LΦ\L0∩L1−
U,S,M is a Markov chain and (c) follows since X|LΦ\L0∩L1 −Ψ|LΦ\L0∩L1 − Y ,Z, LΦ\L0 ∩ L1 is a Markov
chain.
Whenever #e(ψ|lφ\l0∩l1) ≥ (ǫ1ǫ2 − 2δ)βn , then by applying Lemma 10, we get
H(FU (X|LΦ\L0∩L1)|FU , VBE = vBE) ≥ βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ
′)−
2βn(ǫ1ǫ2−3δ−δ
′)−(ǫ1ǫ2−2δ)βn
ln 2
= βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ
′)−
2−(δ+δ
′)βn
ln 2
Recall that LΦ ∼ Unif(T \LΦ). By a simple application of Lemma 13 alongwith Chernoff’s bound, we get
P [#e(Ψ|LΦ) ≥ (ǫ1ǫ2 − 2δ)βn] ≥ 1 − ξ, where ξ −→ 0 exponentially fast as n −→ ∞. Since L0 ∩ L1 positions
are unerased in Y , we have P [#e(Ψ|LΦ\L0∩L1) ≥ (ǫ1ǫ2 − 2δ)βn] ≥ 1− ξ. As a result,
H(FU (X|LΦ\L0∩L1)|FU , VBE) ≥ (1− ξ) ·
(
βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ
′)−
2−(δ+δ
′)βn
ln 2
)
Lemma 23 Suppose ǫ1 ≤ 1/2 and suppose Alice, Bob are honest. Then,
1) H(F0(X|L0)|F0, U, VE) ≥ (1− ξ) ·
(
(ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ
′)n− 2
−(δ+δ′)n
ln 2
)
2) H(F1(X|L1)|F1, U, VE) ≥ (1− ξ) ·
(
(ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ′)n−
2−(δ+δ
′)n
ln 2
)
where ξ −→ 0 exponentially fast as n −→∞.
Proof: Suppose vE =
(
z, l0, l1,m,pi, θ,y|l0|j
θ
,y|l1|jθ
)
. Then,
1)
R(X|L0 |U = u, VE = vE) = R
(
X|l0 |u, z, l0, l1,m,pi, θ,y|l0|j
θ
,y|l1|jθ
)
= R
(
X|l0 |u, z, l0, l1,m,pi, θ,y|l0|j
θ
,y|l1|jθ , jθ
)
(a)
= R
(
X|l0 |z, l0,y|l0|j
θ
, jθ
)
(b)
= R
(
X|l0|jc
θ
|z, l0,y|l0|j
θ
, jθ
)
(c)
= R
(
X|l0|jc
θ
|z|l0|jc
θ
)
= #e
(
z|l0|jc
θ
)
where (a) follows since X|L0−Z,L0,Jθ,Y |L0|J
Θ
−U,L1,M ,Π,Θ,Y |L1|JΘ is a Markov chain, (b) follows
since Y |L0|J
Θ
is the same as X|L0|J
Θ
and (c) follows since X|L0|Jc
Θ
−Z|L0|Jc
Θ
−Z,L0,JΘ,Y |L0|J
Θ
is a
Markov chain.
Whenever #e
(
z|l0|jc
θ
)
≥ (ǫ2 − δ)
∣∣∣l0|jc
θ
∣∣∣ = (ǫ2 − δ)(βn− γn), then applying Lemma 10, we get:
H(F0(X |L0)|F0, U = u, VE = vE) ≥ (ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ
′)n−
2(ǫ1ǫ2−5δ−2δ˜−δ
′)n−(ǫ2−δ)(ǫ1−δ)n
ln 2
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≥ (ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ
′)n−
2−(δ+δ
′)n
ln 2
Also, by Chernoff’s bound, P
[
#e
(
Z|L0|Jc
Θ
)
≥ (ǫ2 − δ)
∣∣∣L0|Jc
Θ
∣∣∣] ≥ 1− ξ, where ξ −→ 0 exponentially fast
as n −→∞. Thus, we get
H(F0(X |L0)|F0, U, VE) ≥ (1 − ξ) ·
(
(ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ
′)n−
2−(δ+δ
′)n
ln 2
)
2) The argument to show that
H(F1(X |L1)|F1, U, VE) ≥ (1 − ξ) ·
(
(ǫ1ǫ2 − 5δ − 2δ˜ − δ
′)n−
2−(δ+δ
′)n
ln 2
)
is very similar to the above argument.
Lemma 24 Suppose ǫ1 > 1/2 and suppose Alice, Bob are honest. Then,
H(FU (X|LΦ\L0∩L1)|FU , U, VE) ≥ (1 − ξ) ·
(
βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ
′)−
2−(δ+δ
′)βn
ln 2
)
H(FU (X|LΦ\L0∩L1)|FU , U, VE) ≥ (1 − ξ) ·
(
βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ
′)−
2−(δ+δ
′)βn
ln 2
)
where ξ −→ 0 exponentially fast as n −→∞.
Proof: Suppose vE = (z,m,pi, θ,y|l0∩l1). Then, for i = 0, 1 :
R(X|Li\L0∩L1 |U = u, VE = vE) = R(X|li\l0∩l1 |u, z,m,pi, θ,y|l0∩l1)
= R(X|li\l0∩l1 |u, z,m,pi, θ,y|l0∩l1 , li\l0 ∩ l1)
(a)
= R(X|li\l0∩l1 |z, li\l0 ∩ l1)
= R(X|li\l0∩l1 |z|li\l0∩l1)
= #e(z|li\l0∩l1)
where (a) follows since X|Li\L0∩L1 −Z, Li\L0 ∩ L1 − U,M ,Π,Θ,Y |L0∩L1 is a Markov chain.
Whenever #e(z|li\l0∩l1) ≥ (ǫ2 − δ)|li\l0 ∩ l1| = (ǫ2 − δ)(βn − |l0 ∩ l1|), then by applying Lemma 10 we get:
H(FU (X|LΦ\L0∩L1)|FU , U = u, VE = vE) ≥ βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ
′)−
2βn(ǫ1ǫ2−3δ−δ
′)−(ǫ2−δ)(βn−|l0∩l1|)
ln 2
≥ βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ
′)−
2−(δ+δ
′)βn
ln 2
By Chernoff’s bound we know that, for i = 0, 1, P [#e(Z|Li\L0∩L1) ≥ (ǫ2 − δ)|Li\L0 ∩ L1|] ≥ 1 − ξ, where
ξ −→ 0 exponentially fast as n −→∞. As a result,
H(FU (X|LΦ\L0∩L1)|FU , U, VE) ≥ (1− ξ) ·
(
βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ
′)−
2−(δ+δ
′)βn
ln 2
)
.
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By a similar argument,
H(FU (X|LΦ\L0∩L1)|FU , U, VE) ≥ (1− ξ) ·
(
βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 3δ − δ
′)−
2−(δ+δ
′)βn
ln 2
)
.
Lemma 25 Suppose ǫ1 ≤ 1/2, Bob is malicious and #e(Ψ|L1) ≥ (ǫ1ǫ2 − 4δ − 2δ˜)n. Then,
R(X|L1 |VBE = vBE) ≥ (ǫ1ǫ2 − 4δ − 2δ˜)n
Proof: Suppose vBE = (y, z, l0, l1,m,pi, θ). Then,
R(X|L1 |VBE = vBE) = R(X|l1 |y, z, l0, l1,m,pi, θ)
(a)
= R(X|l1 |y, z, l1)
= R(X|l1 |y, z, l1,ψ|l1)
(b)
= R(X|l1 |ψ|l1)
= #e(ψ|l1)
≥ (ǫ1ǫ2 − 4δ − 2δ˜)n
where (a) follows since X|L1 − Y ,Z,L1 − L0,M ,Π,Θ is a Markov chain and (b) follows since X|L1 −
Ψ|L1 − Y ,Z,L1 is a Markov chain.
Lemma 26 Suppose ǫ1 > 1/2, Bob is malicious and #e(Ψ|L0\L0∩L1) ≥ βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 2δ). Then,
R(X |L0\L0∩L1 |VBE = vBE) ≥ βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 2δ)
Proof: Suppose vBE = (y, z,m,pi, θ). Then,
R(X|L0\L0∩L1 |VBE = vBE) = R(X|l0\l0∩l1 |y, z,m,pi, θ)
= R(X|l0\l0∩l1 |y, z,m,pi, θ, l0\l0 ∩ l1)
(a)
= R(X|l0\l0∩l1 |y, z, l0\l0 ∩ l1)
= R(X|l0\l0∩l1 |y, z, l0\l0 ∩ l1,ψ|l0\l0∩l1)
(b)
= R(X|l0\l0∩l1 |ψ|l0\l0∩l1);
= #e(ψ|l0\l0∩l1)
≥ βn(ǫ1ǫ2 − 2δ)
where (a) follows since X|L0\L0∩L1 − Y ,Z, L0\L0 ∩ L1 −M ,Π,Θ is a Markov chain and (b) follows since
X|L0\L0∩L1 −Ψ|L0\L0∩L1 − Y ,Z, L0\L0 ∩ L1 is a Markov chain.
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APPENDIX E
INDEPENDENT OBLIVIOUS TRANSFERS OVER A BROADCAST CHANNEL: PROOFS OF LEMMAS 7, 8
A. Proof of Lemma 7
When ǫ1 ≤ 1/2, Protocol 5 is the same as Protocol 1. And so, this proof is the same as the proof of Lemma 1.
As a result, we consider only the case when ǫ1 > 1/2 in this proof. We use a sequence (Pn)n∈N of Protocol 5
instances and we show that (12) - (19) are satisfied for (Pn)n∈N.
Note that:
VA = {K0,K1,J0,J1,X,Λ}
VB = {U,Y ,Λ}
VC = {W,Z,Λ}
where Λ = {Λ˜,Λtwoparty}, with Λ˜ = {L0, L1, L, F0, F1,K0⊕F0(X|L0 ,K1⊕F1(X |L1)} and Λtwoparty denoting
the public messages exchanged during the execution of the two-party OT protocol [2] between Alice and Cathy.
Let Υ be the event that Pn aborts in Step 2. Then, due to Chernoff’s bound, P [Υ = 1] −→ 0 exponentially fast
as n −→ ∞. As in proofs of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it suffices to prove that the conditional versions of (12)
- (19), conditioned on the event Υ = 0, hold for (Pn)n∈N. The arguments in rest of this proof are all implicitly
conditioned on Υ = 0.
1) (12) holds for (Pn)n∈N for the same reasons that (4) holds for Protocol 1.
2) (13) holds for (Pn)n∈N due to the correctness of the two-party OT protocol [2].
3) To show that (14) holds for (Pn)n∈N, we proceed as follows:
I(KU ,JW ;VB , VC) = I(KU ,JW ;U,W,Y ,Z,Λ)
= I(KU ,JW ;U,W,Y ,Z, Λ˜,Λtwoparty)
= I(KU ;U,W,Y ,Z, Λ˜,Λtwoparty)
+ I(JW ;U,W,Y ,Z, Λ˜,Λtwoparty|KU )
(a)
= I(KU ;U,Y ,Z, Λ˜) + I(JW ;U,W,Y ,Z, Λ˜,Λtwoparty|KU )
= I(KU ;U,Y ,Z, Λ˜) + I(JW ;U,W,Y ,Z, Λ˜,Λtwoparty,KU )
(b)
= I(KU ;U,Y ,Z, Λ˜) + I(JW ;W,Y ,Z, L,Λtwoparty)
(c)
= I(KU ;U,Y ,Z, Λ˜) + I(JW ;W,Y |L,Z|L,Λtwoparty)
= I(KU ;U,Y ,Z, Λ˜) + I(JW ;W,Z|L,Λtwoparty)
where (a) follows sinceKU−U,Y ,Z, Λ˜−W,Λtwoparty is a Markov chain, (b) follows since JW−W,Y ,Z, L,Λtwoparty−
U, Λ˜,KU is a Markov chain and (c) follows since JW −W,Y |L,Z|L,Λtwoparty−Y ,Z, L is a Markov chain.
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The first term above goes to zero for the same reasons that (5) holds for Protocol 1. The second term goes to
zero due to the OT requirements being satisfied by the two-party OT protocol between Alice and Cathy over
X|L.
4) To show that (15) holds for (Pn)n∈N, we proceed as follows:
I(U ;VA, VC) = I(U ;K0,K1,J0,J1,W,X,Z,Λ)
= I(U ;K0,K1,J0,J1,W,X,Z, Λ˜,Λtwoparty)
(a)
= I(U ;K0,K1,X,Z, Λ˜)
where (a) follows since U −K0,K1,X,Z, Λ˜−W,J0,J1,Λtwoparty is a Markov chain.
The above term goes to zero for the same reason that (6) holds for Protocol 1.
5) To show that (16) holds for (Pn)n∈N, we proceed as follows:
I(W ;VA, VB) = I(W ;K0,K1,J0,J1, U,X,Y ,Λ)
= I(W ;K0,K1,J0,J1, U,X,Y , Λ˜,Λtwoparty)
(a)
= I(W ;J0,J1,X,Y , L,Λtwoparty)
(b)
= I(W ;J0,J1,X|L,Y |L,Λtwoparty)
= I(W ;J0,J1,X|L,Λtwoparty)
where (a) follows since W − J0,J1,X,Y , L,Λtwoparty − U,K0,K1, Λ˜ is a Markov chain and (b) follows
since W − J0,J1,X|L,Y |L,Λtwoparty −X,Y , L is a Markov chain.
The above term goes to zero due to the OT requirements being satisfied by the two-party OT protocol between
Alice and Cathy over X|L.
6) To show that (17) holds for (Pn)n∈N, we proceed as follows:
I(U,W ;VA) = I(U ;VA) + I(W ;VA|U)
= I(U ;VA) + I(W ;VA, U)
≤ I(U ;VA, VC) + I(W ;VA, VB)
The two terms above go to zero since (15) and (16) hold.
7) To show that (18) holds for (Pn)n∈N, we proceed as follows:
I(K0,K1, U,JW ;VC) = I(K0,K1, U ;VC) + I(JW ;VC |K0,K1, U)
= I(K0,K1, U ;W,Z,Λ) + I(JW ;VC ,K0,K1, U)
(a)
= I(K0,K1, U ;W,Z, Λ˜) + I(JW ;VC ,K0,K1, U)
(b)
= I(K0,K1, U ;W,Z, Λ˜) + I(JW ;VC , U)
≤ I(K0,K1, U ;W,Z, Λ˜) + I(JW ;VC , VB)
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where (a) follows since K0,K1, U −W,Z, Λ˜ − Λtwoparty is a Markov chain and (b) follows since JW −
VC , U −K0,K1 is a Markov chain.
The first term above goes to zero for the same reason that (7) holds for Protocol 1. The second term above
goes to zero since (14) holds.
8) The proof for showing that (19) holds is similar to that of showing that (18) holds and is, therefore, omitted.
B. Proof of Lemma 8
For the proof, we use the following lemma:
Lemma 27
I(K0,K1,J0,J1;U,Y ,W,Z|X,Λ) = 0
Proof: Proof is similar to that for Lemma 6 of [2] or Lemma 2.2 of [1] and is, therefore, omitted.
Now,
1
n
H(K0,K1,J0,J1|X,Λ) ≤
1
n
H(K0,K1|X,Λ) +
1
n
H(J0,J1|X,Λ)
This lemma will be proved if we show that each of the two terms on the RHS above is small. We begin by
showing that (1/n) ·H(K0,K1|X,Λ) is small.
For this, we note that Lemma 27 implies I(K0,K1;U |X,Λ) = 0. This further implies :
H(K0,K1|X,Λ) = H(K0,K1|X,Λ, U)
= H(KU ,KU |X,Λ, U)
≤ H(KU |X,Λ, U) +H(KU |X ,Λ, U) (25)
Lemma 27 also implies I(K0,K1;Y |X,Λ, U) = 0. This, in turn, implies I(KU ,KU ;Y |X ,Λ, U) = 0. As a
result, we get
I(KU ;Y |X,Λ, U) = 0
Therefore, we have
H(KU |X,Λ, U) = H(KU |Y ,X,Λ, U)
(a)
= H(KU |Y ,X,Λ, U, KˆU )
≤ H(KU |KˆU )
(b)
= o(n) (26)
where (a) follows since KˆU is a function of VB = (U,Y ,Λ) and (b) follows from (12) and Fano’s inequality.
Finally, we note that (17) implies that I(U ;VA) −→ 0, where VA = (K0,K1,J0,J1,X,Λ). Together with
Lemma 11, this implies that
H(K0|X,Λ, U = 0)−H(K0|X,Λ, U = 1) = o(n)
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H(K1|X,Λ, U = 0)−H(K1|X,Λ, U = 1) = o(n)
We multiply both equations above by 1/2 and subtract, to get
H(KU |X,Λ, U)−H(KU |X,Λ, U) = o(n) (27)
Hence, (26) and (27) together give :
H(KU |X,Λ, U) = o(n) (28)
Using (26) and (28) in (25) gives us:
H(K0,K1|X ,Λ) = o(n) (29)
An exactly analogous argument shows that H(J0,J1|X,Λ) = o(n) and, hence, this lemma is proved.
APPENDIX F
OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER OVER A DEGRADED WIRETAPPED CHANNEL: PROOF OF LEMMA 9
In order to prove Lemma 9, we use a sequence (Pn)n∈N of Protocol 6 instances of rate (r − 2δ˜), where
r < min
{
1
3 · ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1
}
, and show that (8) - (11) hold for (Pn)n∈N. We note that for Pn, the transcript of the
public channel is
Λ = {G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L)⊕Q, F0, F1,K0 ⊕ F0(X |L0∪G˜S),K1 ⊕ F1(X|L1∪G˜S )}. (30)
Let Υ be the indicator random variable for the event that Bob aborts the protocol Pn. Using Chernoff bound,
we see that P [Υ = 1] −→ 0 exponentially fast as n −→ ∞.
1) In order to show (8) holds for {Pn}n∈N, given that P [Υ = 1] −→ 0, it suffices to show that P [KˆU 6=
KU |Υ = 0] −→ 0.
When Υ = 0, Bob knows LU ,X|LU , G˜S ,X|G˜S . Hence, Bob knows X|LU∪G˜S . As a result, Bob knows the
key FU (X |LU∪G˜S ). Hence, Bob can get KU using KU ⊕ FU (X|LU∪G˜S ) sent by Alice. Thus, P [KˆU 6=
KU |Υ = 0] = 0.
2) In order to show (9) holds for {Pn}n∈N, it suffices to show that I(KU ;VB|Υ = 0) −→ 0. All terms and
assertions below are conditioned on the event Υ = 0, but we suppress this conditioning for ease of writing.
I(KU ;VB) = I(KU ;U,Y ,Λ)
= I(KU ;U,Y , G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L)⊕Q, F0, F1,K0 ⊕ F0(X|L0∪G˜S),K1 ⊕ F1(X |L1∪G˜S))
= I(KU ;U,Y , G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L)⊕Q, FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X|LU∪G˜S),KU ⊕ FU (X|LU∪G˜S
))
(a)
= I(KU ;U,Y , G˜, B˜, FL,Q, FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X|LU∪G˜S),KU ⊕ FU (X|LU∪G˜S
))
(b)
= I(KU ;U,Y , G˜, B˜, FL, LU , LU , FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X |LU∪G˜S ),KU ⊕ FU (X |LU∪G˜S
))
(c)
= I(KU ;U,Y , G˜, B˜, FL, LU , LU , FU , FU ,KU ,KU ⊕ FU (X|LU∪G˜S
))
(d)
= I(KU ;U,Y , G˜, B˜, FL, LU , LU , FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X |LU∪G˜S
))
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= I(KU ;KU ⊕ FU (X|LU∪G˜S
)|U,Y , G˜, B˜, FL, LU , LU , FU , FU )
= H(KU ⊕ FU (X |LU∪G˜S
)|U,Y , G˜, B˜, FL, LU , LU , FU , FU )
−H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S
)|KU , U,Y , G˜, B˜, FL, LU , LU , FU , FU )
≤ |FU (X|LU∪G˜S
)| −H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S
)|KU , U,Y , G˜, B˜, FL, LU , LU , FU , FU )
= n(r − 2δ˜)−H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S
)|KU , U,Y ,Y |G˜S , G˜, B˜, FL, LU , LU , FU , FU )
(e)
= n(r − 2δ˜)−H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S
)|FU ,Y |G˜S , G˜S , LU )
= n(r − 2δ˜)−H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S
)|FU ,X|G˜S , G˜S , LU )
(f)
≤ n(r − 2δ˜)−
(
n(r − 2δ˜)−
2n(r−2δ˜)−n(r−δ˜)
ln 2
)
=
2−nδ˜
ln 2
where (a) hold since FL(X |G˜L) is a function of (FL,Y , G˜), (b) holds since (LU , LU ) is a function of
(U,Q, G˜, B˜) andQ is a function of (U,LU , LU ), (c) holds since FU (X |LU∪G˜S ) is a function of (FU ,Y , LU , G˜),
(d) holds since KU is independent of all other variables, (e) holds since FU (X|LU∪G˜S)−FU ,Y |G˜S , G˜S , LU−
KU , U,Y , G˜, B˜, FL, LU , FU is a Markov chain and (f) holds due to R(X |LU∪G˜S | X|G˜S = x|g˜s , G˜S =
g˜S , LU = lu) = |LU | = n(r − δ˜) and Lemma 10.
3) In order to show (10) holds for {Pn}n∈N, it suffices to show that I(U ;VA|Υ = 0) −→ 0. All terms and
assertions below are conditioned on the event Υ = 0, but we suppress this conditioning for ease of writing.
I(U ;VA) = I(U ;K0,K1,X,Λ)
= I(U ;K0,K1,X, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L)⊕Q, F0, F1,K0 ⊕ F0(X |L0∪G˜S),K1 ⊕ F1(X|L1∪G˜S ))
= I(U ;K0,K1,X, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L)⊕Q, F0, F1, F0(X|L0∪G˜S ), F1(X|L1∪G˜S))
(a)
= I(U ;K0,K1,X, G˜, B˜, FL,Q, F0, F1, F0(X |L0∪G˜S), F1(X|L1∪G˜S))
(b)
= I(U ;K0,K1,X, G˜, B˜, FL, L0, L1, F0, F1, F0(X|L0∪G˜S), F1(X |L1∪G˜S))
(c)
= I(U ;K0,K1,X, G˜, B˜, FL, L0, L1, F0, F1)
(d)
= I(U ;L0, L1)
(e)
= 0
where (a) hold since FL(X|G˜L) is a function of (FL,X, G˜), (b) holds since (L0, L1) is a function of
(G˜, B˜,Q) and Q is a function of (L0, L1), (c) holds since F0(X |L0∪G˜S), F1(X|L1∪G˜S ) is a function of
(F0, F1,X, L0, L1, G˜), (d) holds since U −L0, L1−K0,K1,X, G˜, B˜, FL, F0, F1 is a Markov chain and (e)
holds since the channel acts independently on each input bit and since |L0| = |L1|.
4) In order to show (11) holds for {Pn}n∈N, it suffices to show that I(K0,K1, U ;VE |Υ = 0) −→ 0 as n −→∞.
All terms and assertions below are conditioned on the event Υ = 0, but we suppress this conditioning for ease
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of writing.
I(K0,K1, U ;VE) = I(KU ,KU , U ;VE)
= I(U ;VE) + I(KU ;VE |U) + I(KU ;VE |U,KU )
= I(U ;VE) + I(KU ;U, VE) + I(KU ;U,KU , VE)
We look at each of the above three terms separately.
I(U ;VE)
= I(U ;Z,Λ)
= I(U ;Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L)⊕Q, F0, F1,K0 ⊕ F0(X|L0∪G˜S),K1 ⊕ F1(X |L1∪G˜S))
≤ I(U ;Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L)⊕Q, F0, F1,K0, F0(X|L0∪G˜S ),K1, F1(X |L1∪G˜S))
(a)
= I(U ;Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L)⊕Q, F0, F1, F0(X |L0∪G˜S), F1(X|L1∪G˜S ))
= I(U ;FL(X|G˜L)⊕Q, F0(X |L0∪G˜S), F1(X|L1∪G˜S )|Z, G˜, B˜, FL, F0, F1)
= H(FL(X|G˜L)⊕Q, F0(X |L0∪G˜S), F1(X|L1∪G˜S )|Z, G˜, B˜, FL, F0, F1)
−H(FL(X|G˜L)⊕Q, F0(X |L0∪G˜S), F1(X|L1∪G˜S )|U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, F0, F1)
≤ |FL(X|G˜L)|+ |F0(X|L0∪G˜S)|+ |F1(X|L1∪G˜S )|
−H(FL(X|G˜L), F0(X|L0∪G˜S), F1(X |L1∪G˜S)|Q, U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, F0, F1)
(b)
= |FL(X |G˜L)|+ |F0(X|L0∪G˜S )|+ |F1(X|L1∪G˜S )|
−H(FL(X|G˜L), F0(X|L0∪G˜S), F1(X |L1∪G˜S)|LU , LU , U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, F0, F1)
= |FL(X|G˜L)|+ |F0(X|L0∪G˜S)|+ |F1(X|L1∪G˜S )|
−H(FL(X|G˜L), FU (X|LU∪G˜S), FU (X |LU∪G˜S
)|LU , LU , U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FU , FU )
(c)
= |FL(X|G˜L)|+ |F0(X|L0∪G˜S)|+ |F1(X|L1∪G˜S )|
−H(FL(X|G˜L), FU (X|LU∪G˜S), FU (X |LU∪G˜S
) | LU , LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S ,Z|G˜L , G˜S , FL, FU , FU )
= |FL(X|G˜L)|+ |F0(X|L0∪G˜S)|+ |F1(X|L1∪G˜S )| −H(FL(X|G˜L) | LU , LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S ,Z|G˜L , G˜S , FL, FU , FU )
−H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S), FU (X|LU∪G˜S
) | FL(X|G˜L), LU , LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S ,Z|G˜L , G˜S , FL, FU , FU )
(d)
= |FL(X |G˜L)| −H(FL(X |G˜L) | FL,Z|G˜L)
+ |F0(X |L0∪G˜S)|+ |F1(X|L1∪G˜S)| −H(FU (X |LU∪G˜S), FU (X|LU∪G˜S
) | LU , LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S , G˜S , FU , FU )
= |FL(X|G˜L)| −H(FL(X|G˜L) | FL,Z|G˜L) + |F0(X |L0∪G˜S)|+ |F1(X|L1∪G˜S)|
−H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S) | LU , LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S , G˜S , FU , FU )
−H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S
) | FU (X|LU∪G˜S), LU , LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S , G˜S , FU , FU )
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(e)
= |FL(X|G˜L)| −H(FL(X|G˜L) | FL,Z|G˜L) + |F0(X |L0∪G˜S)|+ |F1(X|L1∪G˜S)|
−H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S) | FU ,Z|LU∪G˜S )−H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S ) | FU (X|LU∪G˜S), LU , LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S , G˜S , FU , FU )
≤ |FL(X|G˜L)| −H(FL(X|G˜L) | FL,Z|G˜L) + |F0(X |L0∪G˜S)|+ |F1(X|L1∪G˜S)|
−H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S) | FU ,Z|LU∪G˜S )−H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S ) | X|LU ,X|G˜S , LU , LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S , G˜S , FU , FU )
(f)
= |FL(X|G˜L)| −H(FL(X|G˜L) | FL,Z|G˜L) + |F0(X |L0∪G˜S)|+ |F1(X|L1∪G˜S)|
−H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S) | FU ,Z|LU∪G˜S )−H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S ) | FU ,X|G˜S , G˜S , LU )
(g)
≤ 2(r − δ˜)n− (1− ξ)
(
2(r − δ˜)n−
22(r−δ˜)n−2nr
ln 2
)
+ n(r − 2δ˜) + n(r − 2δ˜)
− (1− ξ)
(
n(r − 2δ˜)−
2n(r−2δ˜)−n(r−δ˜)
ln 2
)
−
(
n(r − 2δ˜)−
2n(r−2δ˜)−n(r−δ˜)
ln 2
)
= 2ξn(r − δ˜) + (1− ξ) ·
2−2δ˜n
ln 2
+ ξn(r − 2δ˜) + (2 − ξ) ·
2−δ˜n
ln 2
where (a) hold sinceK0,K1 are independent of all the other variables, (b) holds since (LU , LU ) is a function of
(U,Q, G˜, B˜) andQ is a function of (U,LU , LU ), (c) holds since FL(X |G˜L), FU (X|LU∪G˜S), FU (X |LU∪G˜S)−
LU , LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S ,Z|G˜L , G˜S , FL, FU , FU − U,Z, G˜, B˜ is a Markov chain, (d) holds since FL(X|G˜L) −
FL,Z|G˜L−LU , LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S , G˜S , FU , FU and FU (X |LU∪G˜S ), FU (X|LU∪G˜S)−LU , LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S , G˜S , FU , FU−
FL(X |G˜L),Z|G˜L , FL are Markov chains, (e) holds since FU (X |LU∪G˜S )−FU ,Z|LU∪G˜S−LU , LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S , G˜S , FU
is a Markov chain, (f) hold since FU (X|LU∪G˜S) − FU ,X|G˜S , G˜S , LU − X|LU , LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S , FU is a
Markov chain and (g) holds for the following reasons:
• R(X|G˜L | Z|G˜L = z|g˜L) = #e(z|g˜L). Whenever #e(z|g˜L) ≥ (ǫ2 − δ)|G˜L| = 2nr, by applying
Lemma 10 we get H(FL(X |G˜L) | FL,Z|G˜L = z|g˜L) ≥
(
2(r − δ˜)n− 2
2(r−δ˜)n−2nr
ln 2
)
. Since by
Chernoff’s bound, P [#e(Z |G˜L) ≥ (ǫ2 − δ)|G˜L|] ≥ 1− ξ, where ξ −→ 0 exponentially fast as n −→∞,
we have H(FL(X|G˜L) | FL,Z|G˜L) ≥ (1 − ξ) ·
(
2(r − δ˜)n− 2
2(r−δ˜)n−2nr
ln 2
)
.
• Note that R(X|LU∪G˜S | Z|LU∪G˜S = z|lu∪g˜S ) = #e(z|lu∪g˜S ), by Chernoff’s bound P [#e(Z |LU∪G˜S ≥
(ǫ2 − δ)(|LU |+ |G˜S |)] ≥ 1− ξ and (ǫ2 − δ)(|LU |+ |G˜S |) = n(r − δ˜). By a similar argument as above,
we get H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S ) | FU ,Z|LU∪G˜S) ≥ (1− ξ) ·
(
n(r − 2δ˜)− 2
n(r−2δ˜)−n(r−δ˜)
ln 2
)
.
• R(X|LU∪G˜S
| X|G˜S = x|g˜S , G˜S = g˜S , LU = lu) = |LU | = n(r − δ˜). Applying Lemma 10, we get
H(FU (X |LU∪G˜S
) | FU ,X|G˜S = x|g˜S , G˜S = g˜S , LU = lu) ≥
(
n(r − 2δ˜)− 2
n(r−2δ˜)−n(r−δ˜)
ln 2
)
. As a
result, H(FU (X |LU∪G˜S ) | FU ,X|G˜S , G˜S , LU ) ≥
(
n(r − 2δ˜)− 2
n(r−2δ˜)−n(r−δ˜)
ln 2
)
.
I(KU ;U, VE) = I(KU ;U,Z,Λ)
= I(KU ;U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L)⊕Q, F0, F1,K0 ⊕ F0(X|L0∪G˜S),K1 ⊕ F1(X |L1∪G˜S))
= I(KU ;U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L)⊕Q, FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X|LU∪G˜S),KU ⊕ FU (X|LU∪G˜S
))
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≤ I(KU ;U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L)⊕Q, FU , FU ,KU , FU (X|LU∪G˜S ),KU ⊕ FU (X |LU∪G˜S
))
(a)
= I(KU ;U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L)⊕Q, FU , FU , FU (X|LU∪G˜S ),KU ⊕ FU (X|LU∪G˜S
))
≤ I(KU ;U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L),Q, FU , FU , FU (X|LU∪G˜S),KU ⊕ FU (X|LU∪G˜S
))
(b)
= I(KU ;U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X |G˜L), LU , LU , FU , FU , FU (X |LU∪G˜S),KU ⊕ FU (X |LU∪G˜S
))
= I(KU ;KU ⊕ FU (X|LU∪G˜S
) | U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L), LU , LU , FU , FU , FU (X|LU∪G˜S))
= H(KU ⊕ FU (X|LU∪G˜S
) | U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L), LU , LU , FU , FU , FU (X|LU∪G˜S))
−H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S
) | KU , U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L), LU , LU , FU , FU , FU (X|LU∪G˜S))
≤ |FU (X |LU∪G˜S
)| −H(FU (X |LU∪G˜S
) | KU , U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X |G˜L), LU , LU , FU , FU , FU (X |LU∪G˜S ))
≤ |FU (X |LU∪G˜S
)| −H(FU (X |LU∪G˜S
) | KU , U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X |G˜L), LU , LU , FU , FU ,X|LU ,X|G˜S )
(c)
= |FU (X |LU∪G˜S
)| −H(FU (X |LU∪G˜S
) | FU ,X|G˜S , G˜S , LU )
= n(r − 2δ˜)−H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S
) | FU ,X|G˜S , G˜S , LU )
(d)
≤ n(r − 2δ˜)−
(
n(r − 2δ˜)−
2n(r−2δ˜)−n(r−δ˜)
ln 2
)
=
2−δ˜n
ln 2
where (a) holds since KU is independent of all other variables, (b) holds since (LU , LU ) is a function of
(U,Q, G˜, B˜) and Q is a function of (U,LU , LU ), (c) holds since FU (X |LU∪G˜S) − FU ,X|G˜S , G˜S , LU −
KU , U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X |G˜L), LU , FU ,X|LU is a Markov chain and (d) follows by applying Lemma 10
knowing that R(X|LU∪G˜S | X |G˜S = x|x˜S , G˜S = g˜S , L˜U = l˜u) = |LU | = n(r − δ˜).
I(KU ;U,KU ,VE)
= I(KU ;U,KU ,Z,Λ)
= I(KU ;U,KU ,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X |G˜L)⊕Q, F0, F1,K0 ⊕ F0(X|L0∪G˜S ),K1 ⊕ F1(X|L1∪G˜S))
= I(KU ;U,KU ,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X |G˜L)⊕Q, FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X |LU∪G˜S ),KU ⊕ FU (X |LU∪G˜S
))
= I(KU ;U,KU ,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X |G˜L)⊕Q, FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X |LU∪G˜S ), FU (X|LU∪G˜S
))
(a)
= I(KU ;U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X |G˜L)⊕Q, FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X |LU∪G˜S ), FU (X|LU∪G˜S
))
≤ I(KU ;U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X |G˜L),Q, FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X|LU∪G˜S), FU (X |LU∪G˜S
))
(b)
= I(KU ;U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X |G˜L), LU , LU , FU , FU ,KU ⊕ FU (X|LU∪G˜S), FU (X |LU∪G˜S
))
= I(KU ;KU ⊕ FU (X |LU∪G˜S), FU (X|LU∪G˜S
)|U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L), LU , LU , FU , FU )
= H(KU ⊕ FU (X|LU∪G˜S), FU (X |LU∪G˜S
)|U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L), LU , LU , FU , FU )
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−H(FU (X |LU∪G˜S ), FU (X|LU∪G˜S
)|KU , U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L), LU , LU , FU , FU )
≤ |FU (X|LU∪G˜S )|+ |FU (X|LU∪G˜S
)|
−H(FU (X |LU∪G˜S ), FU (X|LU∪G˜S
)|KU , U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X|G˜L), LU , LU , FU , FU )
(c)
= |FU (X|LU∪G˜S )|+ |FU (X|LU∪G˜S
)|
−H(FU (X |LU∪G˜S ), FU (X|LU∪G˜S
) | Z|LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S , G˜S , LU , LU , FU , FU )
= |FU (X|LU∪G˜S )|+ |FU (X|LU∪G˜S
)|
−H(FU (X |LU∪G˜S ) | Z|LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S , G˜S , LU , LU , FU , FU )
−H(FU (X |LU∪G˜S
) | FU (X|LU∪G˜S),Z|LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S , G˜S , LU , LU , FU , FU )
(d)
= |FU (X|LU∪G˜S)|+ |FU (X|LU∪G˜S
)| −H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S) | FU ,Z|LU∪G˜S)
−H(FU (X |LU∪G˜S
) | FU (X|LU∪G˜S),Z|LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S , G˜S , LU , LU , FU , FU )
≤ |FU (X|LU∪G˜S )|+ |FU (X|LU∪G˜S
)| −H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S) | FU ,Z|LU∪G˜S )
−H(FU (X |LU∪G˜S
) | X|LU ,X|G˜S ,Z|LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S , G˜S , LU , LU , FU , FU )
(e)
= |FU (X|LU∪G˜S )|+ |FU (X|LU∪G˜S
)| −H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S) | FU ,Z|LU∪G˜S )
−H(FU (X |LU∪G˜S
) | FU ,X|G˜S , G˜S , LU )
= n(r − 2δ˜) + n(r − 2δ˜)−H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S) | FU ,Z|LU∪G˜S)−H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S) | FU ,X|G˜S , G˜S , LU )
(f)
≤ n(r − 2δ˜) + n(r − 2δ˜)− (1− ξ)
(
n(r − 2δ˜)−
2n(r−2δ˜)−n(r−δ˜)
ln 2
)
−
(
n(r − 2δ˜)−
2n(r−2δ˜)−n(r−δ˜)
ln 2
)
= ξn(r − 2δ˜) + (2 − δ˜) ·
2−δ˜n
ln 2
where (a) hold since KU is independent of all other variables, (b) holds since (LU , LU ) is a function of
(U,Q, G˜, B˜) andQ is a function of (U,LU , LU ), (c) holds since FU (X|LU∪G˜S), FU (X |LU∪G˜S )−Z|LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S , G˜S , LU , LU , FU , FU−
KU , U,Z, G˜, B˜, FL, FL(X |G˜L) is a Markov chain, (d) holds since FU (X|LU∪G˜S )−FU ,Z|LU∪G˜S−Z|LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S , G˜S , LU ,
LU , FU is a Markov chain, (e) holds since FU (X|LU∪G˜S)−FU ,X|G˜S , G˜S , LU−X|LU ,Z|LU ,Z|LU ,Z|G˜S , LU , FU
is a Markov chain and (f) holds for the following reasons:
• R(X|LU∪G˜S | Z|LU∪G˜S = z|lu∪g˜S ) = #e(z|lu∪g˜S ). Whenever #e(z|lu∪g˜S ) ≥ (ǫ2 − δ)(|LU | +
|G˜S |) = n(r− δ˜), then by applying Lemma 10 we get H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S) | FU ,Z|LU∪G˜S = z|lu∪g˜S ) ≥(
n(r − 2δ˜)− 2
n(r−2δ˜)−n(r−δ˜)
ln 2
)
. By Chernoff’s bound, P [#e(Z|LU∪G˜S ) ≥ (ǫ2− δ)(|LU |+ |G˜S |)] ≥ 1− ξ,
where ξ −→ 0 exponentially fast as n −→ ∞. As a result, H(FU (X |LU∪G˜S ) | FU ,Z|LU∪G˜S) ≥
(1− ξ)
(
n(r − 2δ˜)− 2
n(r−2δ˜)−n(r−δ˜)
ln 2
)
.
• R(X|LU∪G˜S
| X|G˜S = x|g˜S , G˜S = g˜S , LU = lu) = |LU | = n(r − δ˜). Applying Lemma 10 we get:
H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S
) | FU ,X|G˜S = x|g˜S , G˜S = g˜S, LU = lu) ≥
(
n(r − 2δ˜)−
2n(r−2δ˜)−n(r−δ˜)
ln 2
)
.
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As a result, H(FU (X|LU∪G˜S) | FU ,X|G˜S , G˜S , LU ) ≥
(
n(r − 2δ˜)− 2
n(r−2δ˜)−n(r−δ˜)
ln 2
)
.
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